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ABSTRACT 
State economic developmen t planning involves a 
complex series of interrelationships among many different 
areas . While land uses, transportation networks and 
economic conditions receive the majority of attention 
in most economic development planning, human resources 
are an important and often underestinated resource. 
In 1978, the Age Discrimination in Employment ct 
of 1967 was amend i d to allow workers to retire at age 
70. Since worker retirements have historically created 
many job opportunities for younger workers, including 
both internal promotions and employment opportunities 
for workers ente r ing the labor fo r ce f o r th e first time, 
serious q uestions have been raised as to the impact of 
this legislation on the job mobility opportunities 
f o~ younger workers, women and ninorities . It has been 
speculated that a decrease in the job mobility opportunities 
for these groups will accel e rate out-migration from Rhode 
Island, a development that will negatively affect the 
economic health and vitality of the state. 
This research project will examine the impact of 
raising the age of mandatory retirement on the above 
mentioned groups of workers within the Rhode Island 
manufacturing con~unity. In order to accurately assess 
the impacts, a mail survey of 107 manufacturing firns 
located in Rhode Island was conducted, which provided a 
79 percent return of all questionnaires . 
The results of this survey indicate that job mobility 
for younger workers will be impaired by allowing older 
workers to work for longer periods of time . In addit i on, 
employers predict that under continuing high rates of 
inflation, the t rend toward early retirement before age 
65 will be completely reversed . 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, work in America has been characterized by 
competition among the various groups comprising the labor 
force. The nature and extent of this competition has 
characterized the context of many public policy decisions. 
For example, legislation by the Federal government to re-
strict imports or the implementation of immi gration laws 
that limit the number of foreign born allowed to emi grate to 
this country are instances of overt uses of public policy to 
mollify external forces affecting the degree of competition 
for work within the economy . 
In addition to the use of public policy as an instru-
ment to exert direct control over external forces that 
affect the nature and degree of competition in the work-
place public policy has also been used as a vehicle to in-
fluence indirectly the forces that affect those currently 
competing for work. Thus , policies designed to increase em-
ployment for the handicapped, women, minorities or the 
unemployed as well as policies designed to regulate the 
minimum wages, maximum hours and other standards of work 
can be viewed as public policy attempts to mediate between 
the competing interests within the workforce. 
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It is within this framework of competition for work 
that the issues of job opportunity and occupational 
mobility can be viewed. Numerous examples exist of public 
policies designed to increase the opportunity of workers 
to compete in the labor force. Perhaps the best example 
of a comprehensive public policy designed to assure all 
Americans the right to equal opportunity in the workforce 
has been the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which under Title VII 
outlawed discrimination in employment based on sex, race, 
color, religion and national origin. 
While the question of increasing the opportunity to 
compete for work in the labor market has been addressed 
through legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
occupational mobility has never been the subject of any 
comprehensive legislation. Although occupational or job 
mobility has a variety of facets, it is most commonly 
associated with the ability of workers to advance along the 
occupational ladder through increases in skill, responsi-
bility, independence and income. Attempts to address the 
issue of occupational or job mobility through public 
policy would be particularly problematic, as internal 
mobility tends to be a function of worker skill and em-
ployer demand. 
However, recent federal legislation has taken a 
dramatic step toward increasing the right of older workers 
to postpone retirement until age 70. This policy raises 
serious questions as to the impacts of this legislation on 
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the job mobility for younger workers, women, and minori-
ties. In 1978, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) of 1967 was amended to allow workers to remain in 
the labor force until age 70, an action the Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac regarded as "probably the most far reach-
ing social measure enacted by the 95th Congress. 11 1 
The implications of this public policy change for the 
state of Rhode Island, where labor force participation is 
approximately 2 percent higher than the rest of the country 
and increasing, and where we have an agin g labor force, 
suggest that job mobility for younger workers, women and 
minorities may be impaired, driving many of these workers 
from the state. Such a development would be contrary to 
state economic development goals, which seek a population 
distribution that will contain fewer proportional members 
of the dependent population groups, namely young children 
and retired adu l ts, who must be supported by those in the 
labor force. Thus, societal trends, like those foreshadowed 
by increasing the age of mandatory retirement, have serious 
implications for the economic health and vitality of the 
state. 
This research project will examine the impact of the 
1978 amendment to the ADEA of 1967, focusing specifically 
on the question of the potential impact on job mobility for 
younger workers, women and minorities. This project will 
concentrate on these impacts for manufacturing firms lo-
cated in Rhode Island and will use the employer as the 
unit of analysis. The principal research objectives are: 
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1. To determine the short-term impact of the 
legislation for younger workers, women and 
minorities. 
2. To determine the probable impact on worker 
retirement decisions under continued rates 
of high inflation. 
To achieve these objectives, it was necessary to con-
duct extensive original research, including a survey of 107 
manufacturing firms currently located in Rhode Island. 
The second chapter traces the relevant legislation 
concerning the increase in the age of mandatory retirement. 
The third chapter examines the historical trends toward 
early retirement and the fourth chapter discusses the re-
search findings of other authors. The fifth chapter examines 
the res~1ts of the survey and the final chapter discusses 
the implications for Rhode Island. 
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CHAPTER II 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Perhaps the most salient characteristic of social 
legislation passed during the 1960's has been the expan-
sion of opportunity for all Americans. One of the least 
controversial, and possibly one of the most profound in 
terms of its impact on all workers, was the passage of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 which 
proscribed discrimination in employment on the basis of 
age against persons between the ages of 40 and 65. The 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) added another 
group of protected employees to those delineated in other 
civil rights legislation, most notably Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination 
in employment based on sex, race, color, religion and 
national origin. 
Historically, different categories of discrimination 
have displayed distincitve characteristics both as to the 
nature of the discrimination itself and the history of 
legal responses to it. Although the ADEA is historically 
linked to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it 
has followed its own separate and distinct path. Section 
715 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act directed the Secretary 
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of Labor to study the problem of age discrimination and 
report his findings to Congress. 
The Department of Labor completed this report in 
1965 and found that approximately half of all private 
sector job openings were limited to applicants below age 
55; similarly, persons above age 45 would not be con-
sidered for about one-fourth of all job openings. The 
Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz, concluded that age 
discrimination was widespread, and presented serious con-
sequences for older workers as individuals and the Nation's 
economy. After careful study, the Secretary concluded 
that nonstatutory methods of dealing with age discrimina-
tion would not prove fruitful, and that Congressional 
action was warranted. 
In January, 1967, President Johnson issued a call 
for action to prohibit age discrimination in employment 
during his Message on Older Americans. Less than one month 
later, a bill was introduced to combat age discrimination 
and on June 12, 1968, the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 (P.L. 90-202, 29 U.S.C. 621) became law. 
Although President Johnson displayed concern for the 
welfare of older Americans in many areas, his specific 
concern over the employment prospects for older Americans 
was prompted by the unemployment rate for older workers. 
Historically, unemployment rates are highest for workers 
younger than 25 years of age for many reasons. For example, 
younger workers lack both seniority and the skills of 
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many older workers. Unemployment rates for workers through-
out the United States steadily decreases until workers 
reach the age of forty-five, at which point employment 
rates again begin to increase. This trend has been evi-
dent since 1948 and is generally accurate for all workers . 
Perhaps more important than the rate of unemployment is 
the trend relative to the duration of unemployment for 
older workers. In 1967, nearly 25 percent of all unem-
ployed male workers older than 45 years of age were un-
employed longer than fifteen (15) weeks. 2 By contrast, 
the 1976 duration of unemployment for all workers was 
nearly 16 weeks, but the duration of unemployment for 
3 workers 55 years and older was more than 23 weeks . It 
is important to note that statistics relating to unem-
ployment for older workers must be considered conservative 
estimates as many older workers faced with the prospect of 
long-term unemployment will simply retire or drop out of 
the labor force. In addition, recent nationwide studies 
conducted in 1977 and 1978 at the National Opinion Research 
Center clearly show that while few workers older than 50 
years of age expected to lose their job within the next 
year, over 50 percent thought they would experience dif-
ficulty in securing another job with commensurate pay and 
benefits. 4 
The distribution and severity of the unemployment 
burden and the programs appropriate to deal with it are 
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of obvious concern to policy makers and it is within 
this context that the Congress considered the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967. Generally, the 
act was designed to reduce two distinct elements in the 
unfairness of prevailing hiring and firing practices. 
First, it attempted to end the discrimination that re-
sulted from a misunderstanding of the relationship be-
tween - age and job performance. Second, it attempted to 
end the discrimination that resulted from a deliberate 
desire or willingness to take advantage of a chronological 
fact. Although originally passed in 1967, the act has been 
amended in 1974 and 1978. 
Among the original statement of findings and purpose, 
Congress declared that older workers faced difficulty in 
retaining jobs, securing employment once unemployed, were 
subjected to arbitrary age limits in employment that worked 
to the disadvantage of older workers; and in industries 
affecting commerce, were subject to arbitrary discrimina-
tion in employment, burdening commerce and the free flow 
of goods in commerce. (ADEA, Section 2(a)). The purpose 
of the act was to: 
"promote employment of older persons based 
on their ability rather than age; to pro-
hibit arbitrary age discrimination in em-
ployment; to help employers and workers 
find ways of meeting problems arising from 
the impact of age on employment." 
(ADEA, Section 2(b)). 
Generally, the 1967 act made it illegal to fire or 
to refuse to hire applicants solely because of age. Em-
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ployment agencies were forbidden to refuse to refer ap-
plicants to job openings because of age. The act all but 
prohibited placing want ads specifying age preferences 
and it forbade labor unions to exclude or expel people 
from membership because of age. However, under Section 
4(f) the act did not prohibit hiring on the basis of age 
when age was "a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the par-
ticular business", or where the differentiation "is based 
on reasonable factors other than age." (1967 ADEA Sec-
tion 4(f)(l)). As an example of a bona fide occupational 
qualification, a job advertisement calling for a child 
actor for a youthful role in a movie or play would be a 
legitimate advertisement. Also, a differentiation based 
on reasonable factors other than age might involve an oc-
cupation where physical strength or other physical ability 
is important to the health and safety of the worker, as 
in the case of air traffic controllers or law enforcement 
officials. Section 4(f) of the original act outlined the 
exceptions to the extent of coverage intended under the act, 
and as might be expected, proved to be a source of confusion 
between employees and employers, ultimately resulting in a 
number of court cases and necessitating amendments to the 
act, One of the three exceptions provided under Section 4(f) 
allowed employers to observe the terms of a "bona fide 
seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan " , 
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such as a retirement or insurance plan, which is not "a 
subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Act, except that 
no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to 
hire any individual." (ADEA, Section 4(f)(2). Generally, 
this provision, initiated by New York Senator Jacob Javits, 
was intended to allow for differential fringe benefits for 
newly hired older workers. Javits' concern was prompted by 
his belief that in the absence of this provision, "employ-
ers might actually have been discouraged from hiring older 
workers because of the increased costs involved in provid-
ing certain types of benefits to them. 115 Finally, the least 
controversial exception, Section 4(f) (3), did not make it 
unlawful for employees to be discharged or otherwise dis-
ciplined for good cause. 
The original Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 also called for a study of the institutional and other 
arrangements which encourage involuntary retirement, to be 
conducted by either the Department of Labor or by contract. 
This study has not been completed, but is currently in 
progress, 
Originally, enforcement responsibility was given to 
the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Adminis-
tration, Aggrieved individuals were able to bring a civil 
action in court against employers, as long as the employer 
had twenty-five or more employees for each working day in 
each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year . The act also covered employment 
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agencies and labor organizations. As originally passed, 
the Act's coverage was extended to individuals at least 
forty (40) years of age but less than sixty-five (65) years 
of age. 
Since its passage, the Act has been amended in 1974 
and 1978. The 1974 amendments (P.L. 93-259) expanded the 
number of employees covered under the Act by including em-
ployees of a State or a political subdivision of a state. 
In addition, the 1974 amendments also covered nondiscrimina-
tion on account of age in Federal government employment and 
authorized the Civil Service Commission to enforce the pro-
visions in the act relating to Federal Civil Service em-
ployment. Significantly, the coverage of the Act was revised 
to include employers of twenty (20) or more employees, con-
sistent with changes in the Fair Labor Standards Amendments 
of 1974 (P.L. 93-259, Section 28, enacted April 8, 1974). 
Enforcement procedures are essentially similar to those 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, with the most significant 
difference relating to the requirement that the Secretary 
of Labor attempt to "eliminate discriminatory practices 
through informal methods of conference, conciliation and 
persuasion before instituting any legal proceedings. 116 All 
covered employers, employment agencies and labor organiza-
tions are required to post, in a conspicuous place on the 
premises, official notices outlining the rights of indi-
viduals covered by the Act. 
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The 1978 Amendments to the Act (P.L. 95-256) con-
tained a number of provisions extending the age group of 
employees who are protected by the provisions of the Act. 
Generally, the act prohibited the mandatory retirement of 
workers under age 70 solely on the basis of age. Two sig-
nificant exemptions were, however, allowed. First, it 
permitted the compulsory retirement of "bona fide execu-
tives" or those in "high policymaking positions at age 65 
where such executives have maintained their positions for 
at least two years prior to retirement" and are entitled 
to an "immediate, nonforfeitable retirement benefit from 
their current employer's plan or plans of at least $27,000 
annually, exclusive of their own contributions and Social 
Security." (ADEA, Section 12(c)).Second, it allowed, until 
June 30, 1982, the involuntary retirement of teachers at 
age 65 where such individuals serve under contracts of un-
limited tenure at institutions of higher education, as 
defined by Section 1201 of the Higher Education Act of 1965. 
(ADEA, Section 12(d)). 
At this point it should be noted that the ADEA does not 
preempt state law (Section 14(a)~.For example, manditorily 
retiring workers at age 70, although permitted under the 
ADEA may violate a particular state's law prohibiting man-
datory retirement at any age. In fact, a number of states -
Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Mary-
land, Michigan, Montana, Nevade, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
and West Virginia - place no upper age limit on the retire-
ment of older workers. In addition, Alaska and Montana do 
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not permit the bona fide pension plan exemption. 
In Maine, public sector employees may not be forced 
to retire solely because of age and Florida law contains 
similar coverage for state employees. Similar coverage was 
extended to city workers by the cities of Los Angeles, 
California and Seattle, Washington. 
As a result of the Section 14(a) provision, the impact 
of the 1978 amendments on companies which operate in the 
above mentioned states is academic as state law supersedes 
federal law when the state law allows a more liberal defi-
nition of retirement age. In addition, companies that 
operate in several states may be forced to abandon manda-
tory retirement as a matter of corporate policy. 
In summary, the ADEA of 1967, as amended through 1978, 
covers workers age 40 to 70. The act covers all firms em-
ploying 20 or more persons and protects these workers from 
arbitrary age discrimination in hiring, discharge, pay, 
promotions, fringe benefits and other aspects of employment. 
In addition, the Act's provisions also extend coverage to 
labor organizations of 25 or more members, Federal, state, 
and local government, and employment agencies that serve 
covered employers, Enforcement responsibility for the ADEA 
was transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission from the U, S. Department of Labor on July 1, 1979 
as part of President Carter's Reorganization Plan No. 1. 
The law prohibits the involuntary retirement of workers 
before age 70 in all but two cases. First, employees of at 
-14-
least 65 years of age serving in a bona fide executive 
or high policy-making position and entitled to an an-
nual benefit of $27,000 or more on retirement may be in-
voluntarily retired. In general, the definition of a bona 
fide executive or high policy-making employee is intended 
to cover the head of a significant and substantial local 
or regional operation of a corporation, such as a major 
production facility or retail establishment, but not the 
head of a minor branch, warehouse or store. 7 In addition, 
the head of a division such as finance, marketing, or 
production and manufacturing at a corporate headquarters 
would be included, as would top-level employees without 
supervisory responsibilities such as chief economists or 
8 
chief research scientists of corporations. 
The second exemption from the prohbition on mandatory 
retirement permits, until July 1, 1982, the compulsory re-
tirement of teachers between the ages of 65 and 70 who 
have unlimited tenure at institutions of higher education, 
as defined by Section 120l(a) of the Higher Education Act 
of 1965. Effective September 30, 1978, the upper age limit 
on the coverage of the Act for Federal employees was 
removed, 
Exemptions to the age requirement or limit fall 
essentially into three broad categories. First, where age 
is a bona fide job qualification, such as actors required 
for youthful roles. Second, where the age requirement is 
part of a bona fide seniority system or employee benefit 
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plan, except that mandatory retirement based on age is 
prohibited until age 70. Generally, this exemption was 
intended to allow age to be considered in funding a re-
tirement benefit plan and to determine the level of 
benefits to be paid. It also permits an employer to ex-
clude a newly hired older worker from certain limited 
fringe benefit plans where it would be too costly to fund 
his or her anticipated benefit in the short time before 
he or she reaches the upper age limit of the Act. Nothing 
in the Act is designed to force employees to remain in 
the workforce longer than they want to remain. For example, 
pension plans which call for retirement based on a years 
of service formula, such as the "thirty years and out" 
retirement system found in many manufacturing industries 
are not directly affected by the Act. Significantly, the 
Act does not deal with the issue of voluntary retirement, 
but is concerned with the issue of involuntary or mandatory 
retirement. Forced retirements before age 70 are illegal, 
except for the previously noted exemptions. Voluntary 
separation from the labor force before age 70, for health 
or other personal reasons, is not affected by the Act. 
Complaints are currently investigated by Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) specialists who 
attempt to reconcile such cases administratively, Where 
such attempts prove unsuccessful, the EEOC may file court 
action. Under Federal law, any person age forty years and 
older, discriminated against on account of age by any em-
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player of 20 or more persons, labor organizations of 25 
or more members, employment agencies serving covered em-
ployers or Federal, state and local governments may bring 
a civil action in any Federal district court, and must 
file a charge of unlawful discrimination with the EEOC and, 
in states with an age discrimination law, with the state 
agency responsible for the enforcement of that law. This 
charge must be filed not less than 60 days before taking 
court action and within 180 days of the alleged violation. 
If the state takes action under its own discrimination law, 
the 180 day restriction is increased to 300 days. 
In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved an important 
procedural question of the ADEA which had created a con-
flict among the circuit courts of appeal. In Oscar Meyer 
v. Evans, the Court ruled that alleged victims of dis-
crimination under the Act must first resort to State Ad-
ministrative agencies, where available, before pursuing a 
claim to the Federal level. These Federal claims can only 
be filed after 60 days following the commencement of State 
proceedings. The Court also resolved the issue of what 
rights a claimant has if State jurisdictional requirements, 
such as a time limit, cannot be met. In such cases, the 
Court reasoned, an individual's Federal rights remain in-
tact, but the individual must make the potentially futile 
act of filing a State claim. 
The significance of this ruling lies in the fact that 
enforcement of the ADEA rests, at least initially, with the 
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designated State agency. Until 1978, that responsibility 
was charged to the R. I. State Department of Labor. How-
ever, under President Carter's Reorganization Plan No. 1, 
administrative responsibility for the ADEA is now the 
domain of the State EEOC, located in Rhode Island under 
the Commission for Human Rights, as of September 30, 1980. 
Under Rhode Island state law, age discrimination in 
employment is covered under Title 28, Labor and Labor Re-
lations, generally referred to as the State Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act (FEPA) of 1956, as amended. In 1979, 
Chapter 28~5 of that Act was amended to include age in the 
protected categories of race or color, religion, sex, 
physical handicap or country of ancestral origin. Consis-
tent with the Federal definition, the protected age groups 
were constructed to include anyone between the ages of 
forty (40) and seventy (70), inclusive. (Section 28-5-6, (I) }. 
In addition, state law~ as set forth under the Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act, includes all employers of four (4) or 
more individuals, (Section 28-5-6 (B) ) thereby extending 
coverage of the age discrimination provisions to a greater 
number of workers than covered under Federal law. Although 
employers of firms that employ four (4) or more persons 
but fewer than twenty (20) persons, who believe they have 
been discriminated against on the basis of age, may bring 
their complaint to the State Commission for Human Rights, 
they would be precluded from filing a complaint to a 
Federal court. Rhode Island State law also provides a more 
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liberal definition of a labor organization, as there is 
no provision specifically stating the size of the labor 
organization. 
In 1976, the U, S. Department of Labor estimated that 
about 70 percent of all workers in the United States be-
tween the ages of 40 and 65 were covered under provisions 
of the ADEA. 9Despite Rhode Island's more liberal coverage, 
the age discrimination provisions under state law are con-
servatively estimated to cover over 40 percent or approxi-
mately 80,000 men and women employed in Rhode Island 
businesses and industries. Coverage under the provisions of 
Federal law is conservatively estimated to extend to ap-
proximately 12 percent of all employees or 12,000 workers. 
These estimates are considered conservative as they assume 
that all workers employed in businesses or industries with 
fewer than 4 employees are in the protected age range of 
40 to 70, an assumption that undoubtedly deflates the actual 
number of workers covered under the legislation. Specific 
breakdowns on the age of workers employed by firm size was 
not available, and in the absence of these data, the pre-
ceding estimates must be considered to represent the lower 
boundary for the number of workers covered under age dis-
crimination legislation. 
In attempting to assess the impact of the Act since 
its passage, the U, S. Department of Labor released figures 
on the age discrimination complaints from 1969 to 1976, The 
number of complaints received each year by the Secretary 
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rose from approximately 1,000 in 1969 to over 5,121 by 
1976.10 This rise in complaints can be attributed to the 
increase in the number of workers covered, a greater 
awareness of the ADEA by workers, and insufficient econo-
mic growth in recent years to provide full employment and 
its lingering effect on the older worker. 
Generally, Rhode Island followed a similar trend with 
respect to workers filing age discrimination cases. The 
Rhode Island Department of Labor, which had jurisdiction 
for employment of the law until September, 1979, reported 
the following cases: 
TABLE II-1 
AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES FILED IN RHODE ISLAND 
Fiscal Year Complaints 
1974-75 5 
1975-76 6 
1976-77 1 
1977-78 22 
1978-79 22 
1979-80* 24 
1980-81 (to Sept. 9 ' 1980) 9 
*Enforcement transferred to State Commission for Human Rights 
Source: R. I. Department of Labor, personal letter from 
Armand DiOrio, Legal Officer 
According to the Annual Report filed by the State Com-
mission for Human Rights, the agency has experienced a sig-
nificant number of charges filed on the basis of age. 11 In 
addition, manufacturing industries accounted for almost half 
of all age discrimination charges. 
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During Congressional testimony concerning the impacts 
of raising the age of mandatory retirement to age 70, a 
variety of witnesses representing both the public and pri-
vate sector raised a number of arguments either in favor of 
or in opposition to increasing the age of mandatory retire-
ment. While a lengthy analysis of the testimony is unwar-
ranted, a discussion of the major arguments would be useful 
in understanding the concerns of many witnesses. 
Advocates in favor of leaving the age of mandatory re-
tirement at 65 offered the following major arguments: 
(1) older workers are, as a group, less suited for 
some jobs because they typically have less edu-
cation, declining physical and mental capacity, 
are more resistant to change and do not learn 
new skills as easily as do younger workers. 
(2) medical science has yet to develop an effective 
technique or set of techniques to guage the 
physical and mental health of employees. 
(3) mandatory retirement for all employees is even-
handed and treats all employees uniformly, 
sparing unproductive older workers from the em-
barrassment of being fired or laid off. 
(4) management is better able to plan its workforce 
needs if it knows that workers will retire at a 
certain age, 
(5) older workers represent a more expensive work-
force as employers must pay higher premiums for 
health insurance, life insurance, pensions and 
other fringe benefits. 
(6) mandatory retirement creates new job opportunities 
as well as advancement opportunities for younger 
workers. 
(7) older workers can receive social security or other 
retirement income, while younger workers do not 
have any other income. 
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(8) compulsory retirement is easiest for manage-
ment as it precludes the need for extensive 
employee appraisal systems and reduces the 
likelihood that workers will bring suit against 
the company for age discrimination. 
(9) affirmative action goals will be more difficult 
to achieve as workers will delay retirement, 
thereby creating fewer employment opportunities. 
Advocates in favor of increasing the age of mandatory 
retirement from age 65 to age 70 or beyond, offered the 
following arguments in their testimony to Congressional 
subcommittees: 
(1) mandatory retirement based solely on age is dis-
criminatory, contrary to equal employment oppor-
tunity and a violation of constitutional rights 
concerning equal protection of the law. 
(2) chronological age alone is a poor indicator of 
the ability of a person to be productive on the 
job. 
(3) enforced idleness brought about as a result of 
retirement can have adverse psychological and 
physical effects on older workers. 
(4) mandatory retirement is based on misconceptions 
about the ability of older workers to perform on 
the job. 
(5) mandatory retirement can cause financial hard-
ships for older persons, particularly those older 
workers who would like to continue working in 
order to pay certain financial obligations usually 
considered common for younger people, such as a 
home mortgage, installment payments on cars and 
their children's college tuition. 
(6) forced retirement discriminates against many 
women who have exhibited a discontinuous work 
pattern, interrupted by home or child care 
responsibilities, and who have not had the op-
portunity to become vested for pension benefits. 
(7) compulsory retirement increases the drain on the 
social security system and private pensions by 
forcing workers to participate in these systems 
prematurely, 
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(8) mandatory retirement is based on the myth that 
older workers must make room for younger workers. 
(9) forced retirement causes a reduced gross national 
product through the loss of skills and experience 
possessed by older workers. 
(10) employer pension costs for older workers can be 
reduced by restructuring or negotiating changes 
in pension plans for older workers who work past 
the "normal retirement age." 
Thus, the arguments both for and against mandatory re-
tirement, to a large extent, seem to be reverse images of 
each other. As a case in point, pension and fringe benefit 
costs for older workers are undeniably higher than are these 
same costs for younger workers. Proponents of eliminating 
mandatory retirement would argue that this need not be the 
case, as the pension and fringe benefit package available to 
workers is a negotiable issue. Congressional testimony by 
representatives of the national AFL-CIO claimed that in fact 
the issue of retirement age is one which should be left to 
union and management~ Similarly, but for different reasons, 
businesses supported the position that retirement age not be 
increased legislatively from age 65 to age 70, as business 
was wary of the increased costs to their overall employee 
benefit plan programs~ 
Generally, it can be concluded that allowing workers to 
remain on the job longer will reduce the real cost of a 
pension. However, if pension plans are to differentiate be-
tween younger and older workers, the issue of where these 
distinctions occur may lead to questions of a test of equal 
benefits, a situation that may cause employees to press for 
equal benefits at any age. Pensions, thrift plans or profit-
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sharing plans that give credit for service after age 65 
in determining the amount of retirement income would only 
result in modest overall increases to the cost of pension 
plans. Significant costs to pension plans would result 
when the plans provide hospital, surgical, medical, and 
dental insurance, disability benefits and death benefits 
for older workers as the costs of these insurance programs 
invariably escalate when a worker reaches age 65. Costs of 
such insurance dramatically increase for older employees 
as the older worker is more likely to need the service, 
and in the case of death benefit insurance, a claim is a 
. 12 
certainty at some point. 
Thus businesses would inevitably be faced with the 
difficulty of restructuring their employee benefit plans, 
enforcing their employee appraisal systems more rigorously 
and providing for effective employment planning, all without 
the assistance of mandatory retirement. 
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CHAPTER III 
WHY FEWER OLDER PEOPLE WORK 
The job market status of older workers is becoming 
an increasingly important issue in our society. The older 
population continues to grow in both number and proportion; 
in part, because of longer average life spans and lower 
bith rates, As the proportion of the retired population in-
creases relative to the labor force, pressures will con-
tinue to mount on the resources of the two major retire-
ment systems: Social Security, already strained under a 
sharp rise in both benefits and eligible persons; and 
private pensions, which have been diminished by high rates 
of inflation. Eventually, as the nation experiences a drop 
in the rate of labor force growth, more older workers may 
be required to remain in the labor force easing the pres-
h . ' . 13 sures on t e nation s retirement resources. 
The labor force participation rates for older men have 
decreased sharply during the past thirty years, with the 
rate of decline increasing in recent years. The following 
table shows the national civilian labor force participa-
tion rates for men age 55 to 64 and 65 years of age and 
older, in percent: 
Year 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1978 
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TABLE III-1 
CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATIONS RATES: 
ANNUAL AVERAGEsl 
Age 55-64 
86.9 
86.8 
83.0 
73.5 
Age 65 and Older 
45.8% 
33. 1 
26.8 
20.5 
1Percent of civilian noninstitutional population in the 
civilian labor force. 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training 
Report £i the President, 1979, Table A-4, p. 240. 
As the preceding table illustrates, there has been a 
long-term decline in the participation rate of older males, 
particularly among males age 65 and older. The participation 
rate for men has fallen dramatically since 1961 when it be-
came possible for men to retire early with actuarily re-
duced Social Security benefits. In 1961, the Social Security 
laws were amended to allow men to retire at age 62 with 
permanently reduced benefits, an option that had been 
available to women since 1956. The formula used in comput-
ing this reduction in the monthly benefit amount is a reduc-
tion of 5/9 of 1 percent for each month of retirement 
before age 65. This means that if an individual retires 
and elects to receive Social Security benefits as soon ·as 
he reaches age 62, he will receive a monthly benefit amount 
that is 20 percent less than he would have received if he 
had waited until age 65, In an attempt to reverse the trend 
toward early retirement, Congress added, in 1976, an 
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additional provision in the Social Security legislation 
for an increase in the monthly benefit amount of 1/12 of 
1 percent for each month between ages 65 and 72 for which 
an individual defers retirement. For those attaining age 
62 after 1978, this increment will be increased to 1/4 of 
14 1 percent. 
Liberalized Social Security provisions have contribu-
ted to a decline in labor force participation for many 
workers, particularly those age 62 and older. The follow-
ing table displays the significant decrease in labor force 
participation at age 62, when Social Security benefits 
first become available to workers: 
TABLE III-2 
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES BY AGE GROUPS 
Year 
1957 
1960 
1970 
1975 
55-64 
87 . 5 
86 . 8 
83.0 
7 5 . 8 
Men 
62-64 
82 . 9 
81. 1 
72 . 2 
59 . 7 
Women 
65+ 55-64 
3 7. 5 34.5 
3 3 . 1 37 . 2 
26.8 4 3. 0 
21. 7 41. 0 
65+ 
10 . 5 
10.8 
9 . 7 
8 . 3 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, "Raising the 
Mandatory Retirement Age : Its Effect on the 
Employment of Older Workers," Jun e 1978, p. 24. 
Since 1960 , males have left the labor force in sizeable 
numbers beginning at age 62 , when the previously mentioned 
Social Security benefits first become available. This trend 
is clearly to be expected , as Social Security serves as a 
disin c entive to work . 
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When Social Security legislation was first considered 
in the early 1930's, prior to the passage of the Social 
Security Act of 1935, the country was in the depths of the 
Great Depression and Congress was grappling with the dual 
issues of increasing job opportunities for unemployed young 
workers, as well as with the issue of providing a retirement 
income for older, unemployed workers. In searching for an 
appropriate model for an income maintenance program. the 
Congress looked to the retirement programs then available in 
Germany. 
Nearly 100 years ago, Otto Von Bismarck, then First 
Chancellor of the German Empire, introduced legislation 
which ultimately led to the first comprehensive plan of 
social insurance in the Western world. Beginning in 1881, 
German workers were covered under a national plan of work-
men's accident insurance. In 1883, a comprehensive insur-
ance program against illness was added, followed in 1884 
by the passage of a comprehensive accident insurance program 
for all citizens. Finally, in 1889, a comprehensive in-
validity and old-age insurance program was passed. These 
programs raised the need, for the first time, to define 
"old age 11 • 15 Under the advice if his actuaries, Bismarck 
selected the age of 65, under the assumption that since the 
average life expectancy in the 1880's was between 40 and 45 
years of age, few people would actually live to claim 
benefits. Great Britain passed similar legislation in 1908, 
initially restricting its benefit programs to workers age 
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70 or over, but later reducing the age of eligibility 
to 65. 
Like the social insurance programs developed in Ger-
many, the United States Social Security programs have 
developed in a piecemeal fashion, influenced by political, 
economic and social considerations. The Social Security Act 
of 1935 was the Federal government's first attempt at in-
come maintenance on a sustained basis. 16 The Act established 
retirement benefits for workers in commerce and industry 
(except railroads). Initially, only retired workers age 65 
and older were eligible. The basis for selecting age 65 as 
the age of eligibility for retirement benefits was clearly 
an arbitrary one. In fact, former Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare, Wilbur Cohen, one of the staff who 
helped draft the 1935 Act has written: 
"(T)his brief account of how age 65 was selected in 
the old age insurance program in the United States 
indicates that there was no scientific, social or 
gerontological basis for the selection. Rather, it 
may be said that it was the general consensus that 
age 65 was the most acceptable age." l.]_/ 
In 1939, the Social Security program was amended to in-
elude a 50 percent benefit for spouses, and in 1940, compul-
sory coverage under the Act was extended to farm and 
domestic workers, farmers and other self-employed workers. 
By 1956, women aged 62 to 64 became eligible for re-
duced retirement benefits and similar coverage was extended 
to men by 1961. The principal group not included in the 
Social Security system today are employees of the Federal 
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government. State or local government employees have the 
option of participating in the system . 
Since 1940, Social Security coverage has increased from 
approximately 60 percent of the workforce to 90 percent of 
all workers, as illustrated in the following table: 
Year 
1940 
195 0 
1960 
1970 
1975 
Source: 
TABLE III-3 
SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE 
Annual average 
total paid 
employment 
(in thousands) 
46 .400 
60,000 
67,500 
80 ,600 
86,200 
Employees 
covered by 
Social Security 
(in thousands) 
26,800 
38,700 
59,400 
72,100 
77,600 
Coverage as 
a percent of 
employment 
57.8% 
64.5 
88.0 
89.5 
90 .0 
Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supple-
ment, 1975. HEW Publication No. 77-11700, table 35, 
p. 68 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977). 
The dramatic rise in the number of employees covered by 
the Social Security Act is further complicated by a conco-
mitant rise in the percent of eligible workers electing to 
retire at the earliest possible age. Simply stated, the total 
numbers eligible to retire at 62 is not significant in and of 
itself. However , since nearly half of all workers today are 
electing to retire when Social Security benefits first become 
available, the financial burden placed on the Social Security 
becomes readily apparent. The following table shows the 
dramatic increase in the percent of eligible workers elect-
ing to take advantage of Old Age Survivors Insurance (OASI) 
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at the minimum age of el ig i b ility. 
TABLE III-4 
PERCENTAGE OF INSURED WORKERS AGED 62 to 64 
RECEIVING OAS! BENEFITS, SELECTED YEARS 
1957-1976 
BEGINNING OF YEAR Men Women 
1957 N/A 16% 
1962 20% 41% 
1963 29% 45% 
1970 34% 46% 
1974 44% 54% 
1975 46% 55% 
1976 49% 56% 
Source: Social Security S ulletin, Annual Statistical 
Supplement, 1975, Table 52, p. 85. 
Nearly all retirement studies confirm the proposition 
that higher Social Security benefits reduce labor force par-
ticipation and the rapid growth and development of the system 
18 has given early retirement a powerful impetus. 
Since Social Security benefits were originally intended 
to replace earnings lost through retirement and were not in-
tended to be an old-age annuity, recipients have always been 
subjected to an "earnings test". In fact, the 1935 legisla-
tion denied benefits to those with any earnings. However, 
subsequent amendments altered the earnings test requirements. 
For example, in 1950 beneficiaries 75 years and older were 
excluded from the earnings test. In 1954, the exemption was 
lowered to 72 and the 1977 amendments will remove, effec-
tive 1982, the earnings test for everyone over age 70. Cur-
rently, the earnings test reduces benefits by one dollar for 
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each two dollars of earnin g s above an exempt base of 
$5,000. 
The earnings test, as applied to Social Security 
beneficiaries, also functions as a disincentive to work 
for retirees. Researchers have argued that the "true 
marginal tax rate" on earned income above the $5,000 base 
is well above the 50 percent reduction in benefits, so 
that a "middle income worker is hit with a tax rate of 
over 70 percent. 11 19 
A further incentive to retirement, and conversely a 
disincentive to work, concerns the method chosen by 
Congress to raise the benefits paid to beneficiaries. Prior 
to 1972, Congress raised benefits periodically, In 1972, 
Congress passed an automatic adjustment to reflect changes 
in the cost of living. However, this automatic adjustment 
plan had to be reformulated as the adjusted rate was keep-
ing benefits well ahead of inflation. In fact, from 1965 
to 1976, the consumer price index rose 80 percent, while 
benefits increased 119 percent. In 1977, Congress modified 
the adjustment plan to prevent adjustments from increasing 
faster than the rate of inflation. 
Although increased Social Security coverage and bene-
fits are important, they do not fully explain the labor 
force trends. In addition to increases in Social Security 
coverage, disability and pension coverage has also ex-
panded. In 1956, disability insurance was incorporated 
into the Social Security system, providing benefits for 
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disabled workers 50 and older. Subsequent legislation 
added benefits for the dependents of disabled workers and 
in 1960 protection was extended to disabled workers re-
gardless of age. Poor health, regardless of the cause, 
certainly inhibits both a worker's productivity and the 
range of jobs available to that worker. Although the 
general level of health among the population is improving, 
as reflected in gains in the average life expectancy for 
all Americans, the percent of workers eligible to receive 
Social Security disability benefits has also been increas-
ing, contributing at least in part, to lower labor force 
participation rates for older workers. 
Year 
1957 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1972 
TABLE III-5 
PERCENTAGE OF MEN RECEIVING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY BENEFITS 
SELECTED YEARS - 1957 to 1972 
Age 25-34 
White Black 
.05 
.23 
. 36 
• 4 7 
.08 
.45 
• 7 2 
.98 
Age 35-44 
Whi te Black 
. 15 
.73 
1. 00 
1. 15 
.25 
1. 41 
2.01 
2.30 
Age 45-54 
White Black 
.26 
• 7 2 
1. 66 
2. 3 3 
2.81 
.32 
1. 18 
3.16 
4.38 
5.22 
Source: Frederic Siskind, "Labor Force Participation of Men, 
Age 25-54, by Race", Monthly Labor Review, July, 1975 
pp. 40-42. 
As the above table illustrates, older workers are more 
likely to receive disability benefits than are younger 
workers and black males have a disability rate nearly twice 
that of white males. That health should be an important 
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variable in labor force participation is an obvious, but 
often overlooked, one. Between 1967 and 1977, the number 
of persons receiving Social Security disability payments 
more than doubled, with average monthly benefits increasing 
from $117 million in 1967 to $752 million in 1977.20 
The growth in private pensions has paralleled the 
growth of the Social Security system, fostered in large 
measure by the preferential tax treatment of employer's 
pension contributions and a rise in p ension-fund earnings. 
However, in recent years the private pension system has 
become increasingly threatened by a number of factors. First, 
Social Security payroll deductions are legislated to rise 
from the current 6.13 percent of a taxable wage base of 
$22,900 to 7.15 percent in 1987 with the wage base to be 
icnreased automatically under the law on the basis of the 
annual increase in average earnings in covered employment. 
It has been projected that this taxable wage base will be 
$42,600 in 1987.21 
Increases in the cost of Social Security naturally 
decrease the amount of disposable capital workers and em-
ployers have to invest, thereby decreasing the attractive-
ness of private pension programs. Second, the General 
Accounting Office has concluded that the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) originally enacted 
to protect employee pension plans, has actually contributed 
to the termination of thousands of single-employer benefit 
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pension plans. The study concluded that ERISA inhibited 
the formation and continuation of private pension plans 
by increasing the employer's reporting and disclosure re-
sponsibilities, thus driving up the costs of maintaining 
a private pension plan. 
The third and perhaps most important threat to the 
viability of private pension plans is the real or perceived 
impact of inflation. During periods of either no inflation 
or modest annual rates of inflation, the real value of 
retirement income will remain constant. However, when in-
flation rises, fixed income groups whose money income~ lag 
behind increases in prices, are penalized as their real 
incomes or standards of living decline. The following table 
illustrates the real value of retirement income under al-
ternative rates of inflation: 
TABLE III-6 
Real Replacement Rates After S, 10, lS and 20 
Years of Retirement with Alternative Rates of Inflation 
Years in No 
Retirement Inflation 
0 100 
s 100 
10 100 
lS 100 
20 100 
3% Annual 
Rate of 
Inflation 
100 
86 
74 
64 
SS 
S% Annual 
Rate of 
Inflation 
100 
78 
6 1 
48 
38 
10% Annual 
Rate of 
Inflation 
100 
62 
39 
2lf 
lS 
Source: Robert Clark, The Role £!. Private Pensions in 
Maintaining Living Standards in Retirement 
(Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 
1977), p. 42. 
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Thus, under periods of 10 percent inflation, a pension 
will be reduced in five years to 62 percent of its value 
and within seven years will be worth 50 percent of its 
original value. The dramatic impact of inflation on pension 
plans is further supported by the fact that many unionized 
workers have "sought job security and health and pension 
benefits in preference to immediate wage gains." 22 
Unlike Social Security benefits, which are indexed to 
price changes, many private pension plans do not offer 
automatic cost of living increases. Thus inflation, or the 
threat of inflation, may encourage workers to analyze their 
retirement decision more fully than they have in the past 
and more workers may elect to remain in the labor force 
for longer periods of time. 
The preceding discussion clearly suggests that the re-
tirement decision, like much of human behavior, is ordinarily 
so complex that it cannot be adequately described or measured 
by a single dimension. Several dimensions are usually neces-
sary to describe or measure the retirement decision, among 
them the availability of pension coverage and the age of 
eligibility for benefits, the health of workers and their 
assumptions relevant to their ability to afford retirement. 
In addition to these factors, withdrawal from the labor 
force is also influenced by job satisfaction, the number of 
dependents workers have, the type of industry in which they 
are employed, previous employment experience and the level 
of unemployment in the local labor market. 23 
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The questions of whether workers will continue to 
retire at the "normal retirement age" generally assumed 
to be 65 years old, or whether the trend to early retire-
ment at age 62 will accelerate, remain constant, or be 
reversed, will carry considerable impact for policymakers. 
The appropriate policies selected will carry considerable 
weight with respect to where the financial burden for 
providing payments to those not in the workforce will 
fall within society. 
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CHAPTER IV 
WILL OLDER WORKERS CONTINUE TO LEAVE THEIR JOBS 
The rapid passage of the ADEA Amendments of 1978 was 
characterized by very little opposition in either the House 
or the Senate. In fact, when the bill was originally 
considered only four House members and seven Senators voted 
against it. During Congressional testimony, the major focus 
of the testimony concerned the issue of the right of older 
workers to work unencumbered by an arbitrary age limit. 
That the right to work is a civil right had been established 
as long ago as 1914, where in Smith v. Texas, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the meaning of liberty included the 
right to work. A similar conclusion was reached in Truax v. 
Raich (1915) where it was held that one of the intentions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was to guarantee the right to work. 
The Fifth Amendment has also been interpreted by courts to 
provide the right to work on the basis that the right to 
obtain property assumes the ability to secure and maintain 
employment. Thus, the stated intent of the legislation was 
to remove a legal obstacle which prevented workers from 
remaining in the labor force as long as they were both able 
and willing to continue working. 
The issue of the right to work as a civil right which 
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should be guaranteed to all Americans was clearly the stated 
goal of the legislation as expressed by both Congressman 
Claude Pepper (D-Fla.), the House proponent of the bill that 
eventually became law, as well as by the Senate leader, 
Jacob Javits (D-NY). Pepper summarized his feelings by stating: 
"Our findings to date suggest that mandatory retirement 
is discriminatory and socially unproductive. It squanders 
the talent of older people, and it strains an already 
over-burdened Social Security system, and drives elderly 
persons in so many instances into poverty and despair. 
Mandatory retirement is a cruel camoflage masking age 
discrimination and forced unemployment."24 
Although many of his colleagues agreed with him in 
principle, the question of how many older workers would 
choose to remain in the labor force, with the concominant 
ramifications on the employment opportunities of younger 
workers, concerned many lawmakers. In fact, Dr. Harold 
Sheppard, director of the Center on Work and Aging of the 
American Institutes for Research, testified that many European 
leaders were surprised that Congress was considering raising 
the compulsory retirement age from 65 to 70, in spite of our 
relatively high unemployment, when many European countries with 
similar unemployment rates were considering lowering their 
retirement age to 60.25 Upon further questioning by Representative 
Russo (D-Ill.), Dr. Sheppard provided an answer typical of 
many of the witnesses: 
Mr. Russo: We have a problem (unemployment) right now. 
Do you have any suggestions? 
Dr. Sheppard: We have a big youth employment program. 
Let's give it some support. We have a new 
proposal to give incentives to the private 
sector to hire more young with certain tax 
credits or other kinds of incentives. Let's 
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make sure they do that. 
There is also a very unsettled issue in 
the field of labor economics. There is one 
argument that says there is the fixed lump 
of labor supply and only so many jobs can 
be handed around. 
The other argument is that if you in 
some way get more people employed in the 
labor force, you get an increase in the 
purchasing power, which increases the demand 
for more people to be hired. 
I frankly have to say I 
which one is right. I don't 
one. That is all I can say. 
just a viseral reaction. It 
meeting the problem.26 
don't know 
like the first 
It might be 
is a way of not 
Dr. Sheppard's comments reflect the views of many wit-
nesses who testified before the House Committee on Aging and 
the Subcommittee on Retirement, Income and Employment. 
Comprehensive evidence, such as that found in many formal 
studies, was not available. Instead, witnesses relied on older 
studies or public opinion polls in assessing the impacts of 
increasing the age of mandatory retirement. For example, many 
witnesses and at least one Congressional Working Paper cited 
a 1974 Harris Poll, conducted for the National Council on 
Aging, Inc., that found over 86 percent of those surveyed 
agreed that "nobody should be forced to retire because of age, 
if he wants to continue working and is still able to do a good 
job."27 The Harris Study projected that there were about 4 
million unemployed or retired older persons who would like to 
work. However, this estimate was considered to dramatically 
overstate the number of older workers that would be interested 
in remaining in the labor force. 
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Senator Pell as ked the employment question of Donald 
Elisburg, Assistant Secretary for Emp loyment Standards, 
Department of Labor: 
Senator Pell: If this legislation passed, wh at would be 
the impact, do you think most workers wo uld 
stay on until they are 70 or 68? 
Mr. Elisburg: Well, Senator, we have estimated that 
perhaps 175,000 workers might be involved. 
Senator Pell: In the whole United States? 
Mr. Elisburg: The effect on employment, from some 
preliminary studies, of age 65 to 70, would 
be a labor force impact of approximately two 
tenths of 1 percent for men and one-tenth of 
1 percent for women based on those reaching 
age 65 who would prefer to stay on the job. 
It is reasonable that large numbers of 
employees who would normally be eligible to 
retire at age 65 would continue to retire 
at age 65.28 
In preparing this estimate, the Department of Labor relied 
on two documents: (a) the Social Security Administration's 
Survey .2..f Newly Entitled Beneficiaries (SNEB), and, (b) the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), conducted by the Bureau of 
the Census. 
The Survey of Newly Entitled Beneficiaries (SNEB), con-
ducted by Virginia P. Reno in March 1972, indicated that 11 
percent of the men and 7 percent of the women in the sample 
would have chosen to continue working beyond their compulsory 
retirement age. Wh en the CPS Report's population projections 
are combined with 1970 labor force participation rates for 64 
year olds, there would be an estimated 2,483,000 men and 
1,458,000 women aged 65 to 69 in the labor force in 1985. 
If the increase suggested by the SNEB of 11 percent for men 
and 7 percent for women was calculated, the labor force would 
be increased by 273,000 men and 102,000 women, accounting for 
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an increase of .35 percent.29 This estimate was considered 
excessively high, as it assumes that everyone who wanted to 
work past age 65 would continue to work until age 70. 
The Department of Labor submitted written comments in 
answer to Senator Pell's question and stated that "a judgemental 
figure of 200,000 was arrived at by considering the estimated 
number of workers involuntarily retired through pension plan 
requirements or other reasons. 11 30 Other evidence in support 
of this conclusion was offerred by the Department of Labor 
which observed that the "U.S. labor force does not expand on 
a one-out, one-in" basis.31 The Department noted that indus-
tries and firms experience different economic conditions and 
will respond by increasing or reducing their labor force as 
needed. Thus, because a worker retires, there is no automatic 
movement to hire a new worker, as employers may be reducing 
their workforce through attrition. Conversely, some employers 
may be expanding their workforce even though no workers are 
retiring. The Department concluded that the fact that older 
workers remain in the labor force cannot be considered an 
obstacle to entrance into or mobility within the labor force 
for younger workers. 
The Department also concluded that historical trends toward 
early retirement were not likely to be reversed in the short-
run and that Social Security and private pensions were powerful 
disincentives to work. These trends, already noted in the 
preceeding chapter, existed across the board for both salaried 
and hourly employees in all industries and it was reasoned that 
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older employees, as long as they remained productive, should 
not be forced out of the workforce to make room for younger 
workers. The Department summarized its conclusions by stating, 
"(O)ne cannot program the older worker to a reduced retirement 
income and inactivity as the means to achieve promotion for 
others. This would be robbing one generation to pay another. 11 32 
Other testimony before the House Select Committee on 
Aging from various representatives of corporations clearly 
supported this view. General Motors and the Ford Motor Corpor-
ation indicated that only 2 percent of hourly workers worked 
until the mandatory retirement age of 68 and that 89 percent 
of their employees retired before age 65. Exxon reported that 
about one out of five employees waited until the mandatory 
retirement age of 65 to retire and General Foods reported a 
similar percentage of workers retiring at the mandatory retire-
ment age. Representatives from IBM claimed that since 1970, 
fewer than 20 percent of its 7,000 retireees waited until age 
65, and in 1976, 84 percent of its employees retired before 
age 65. 
In summary, testimony before Congress from industry 
representatives, researchers and the Department of Labor 
supported the trend toward early retirement and offerred no 
conclusive evidence that the impact on job opportunities for 
younger workers would be extensive. 
At this point it should be noted that the studies cited 
in the literature, as well as in Congressional testimony, 
concerning the impacts of increasing the age of mandatory 
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retirement shared a number of similar characteristics. Like 
the study conducted by Reno, much of the information was 
dated. For example, a study conducted by Herbert Parnes at 
Ohio State University, "The Pre-Retirement Years: A Long-
itudinal Study of the Labor Market Experience of Men ," was 
completed in 1971 and concluded that about 8 percent of the 
men surveyed who were mandatorily retired wanted to work longer. 
The Parnes' study used the worker as the "unit of analysis," 
as did the Reno study. Although testimony from representatives 
of major corporations was heard, there were no studies which 
used the employer as the "unit of analysis," and if such 
research had been available, it would have offerred a valuable 
perspective on the question of the impacts of increasing the 
age of mandatory retirement. 
However , since the passage of the 1978 Amendments to 
the ADEA, at least two additional studies have been completed, 
one by Portland State University researchers Lois Copperman, 
Douglas Montgomery and Fred Keast , and another by researchers 
at the Bureau of Natio nal Affairs (BNA). The Portland State 
researchers, using both mail and telephone survey approaches, 
were able to obtain surveys from nearly 2,000 firms for their 
1979 study. While the study examined the potential impact of 
the amendments on the employment opportunities of women, youth 
and minorities, it also considered the impact on pension systems, 
the probable impact of inflation on pensions, and the possible 
extension of worklife for older workers. 
One of the major findings of the Portland State Study was 
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that employers did not expect historical trends toward early 
retirement to be reversed. 33 However, employers believed that 
continuing high rates of inflation would alter worker's 
perceptions of the desirability of early retirement. The 
researchers believe that, in the long run, labor force partic-
ipation rates for older workers would increase and that by the 
year 2000 firms will be increasingly more reliant upon older 
workers, suggesting that the key issue in labor recruitment 
will be the "selective retention of those who could realistically 
choose to end their work life. 11 34 
A second major conclusion of the study, and in many ways 
related to the preceeding observation, will be the increasing 
importance of an employer's performance appraisal system. With 
the increase in the age of mandatory retirement, mar g inally 
productive workers, who would have been retired under the for mer 
age ceiling of 65 might want to work until a g e 70. Businesse s 
would be faced with the decision of allowin g a marginally 
productive older worker to continue workin g or to terminate 
that employee. While firms may have been willin g to allow a 
marginally productive 64 year old employee to work one more 
year to age 65, it is unlikely that firms will allow unproductive 
older workers to work until they are 70. Therefore, it is 
quite likely that personnel appraisal practices will begin to 
examine productivity of older workers more critically. If this 
observation is accurate, it would represent an ironic twist, 
as t h e overriding concern of the legislation was to encourage 
the participation of older wor k ers in t h e wor k force. 
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The third major finding concerned the importance of the 
size of the firm to the applicability of the ADEA amendments. 
Respondents representing firms of over 250 employees almost 
universally acknowledged the legislation's direct application 
to their companies, while those respondents representing 
smaller firms, especially those with fewer than 100 employees, 
saw their companies as being affected with less frequency. 
Although the survey results did not, in general, suggest that 
firms expected the ADEA Amendments of 1978 to have a major 
impact, the effect of the ADEA Amendments was expected to be 
greatest for certain sectors of the economy, as well as by 
firm size . 
Perhaps the most important conclusion of the study, at 
least in terms of its implications for Rhode Island, concerned 
the impact of continued high rates of inflation on the retire-
ment decision of workers . Responses from New England indicated 
that nearly 43 percent of the firms surveyed believed that 
under continuing high rates of inflation, workers would most 
1 . k 1 . . h . . b h 1 . 35 i e y remain in t eir JO s past t e norma re t irement age . 
The frequency of this response was predicted to be fully 30 
percent above the national average . To the extent that the 
Rhode Island economy mirrors the New England economy, the 
long-term implications on employment prospects, in terms of 
both internal mobility and job opportunities, could be seve re . 
However, in an extensive analysis of the influence of the 
ADEA on job opportunities for women, youth and minorities, 
the study concluded that the larger the size of the establish-
ment, the more likely employers are to view the amendments as 
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reducing job opportunities for these groups . Thus, in the 
immediate future, the study concluded that the larger firms, 
because the "criteria for hiring tends to be more objective 
and impersonal than those of smaller firms" are likely to 
retain older workers.36 
In attempting to guage the implication of the conclusion 
contained in the study for the Rhode Island labor force, one 
final conclusion must be highlighted. In general, the researchers 
found that the older the labor force, the less likely the amend-
ments were viewed as reducing job opportunities for youth, 
minorities and women. However, as the proportion of "middle-
aged" workers (ages 40-59) increased, the amendments were viewed 
as reducing job opportunities for both women and minorities. 
This conclusion suggests that firms with older workforces 
fully expect these older workers to retire, thereby creating 
employment opportunities within the firm and that the "younger" 
the workforce, that is, those firms which have few workers 
of retirement age, expect to see fewer job opportunities. While 
this conclusion seems obvious, it does suggest that many 
employers foresee a period of slow economic growth where there 
will be fewer job opportunities as a result of conditions 
within the economy and not as a result of policy changes in 
the age of retirement. 
The second recent study, conducted by the Bureau of 
National Affairs (BNA) in August 1979, involved a survey of 
267 organizations. In this survey, the BNA solicited the 
opinions of personnel representatives from both large and 
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small firms involved in manufacturing, nonmanufacturing and 
nonbusiness organizations. More than 51 percent of the employ-
ers reported "very little impact" from the changes in the 
ADEA legislation, with another 35 percent "feeling no impact. 1137 
However, 21 percent of the employers did find an increase in 
the number of employees electing to postpone retirement past 
the "normal retirement age." Many of the respondents were 
unable to specify the exact increase, although a number did 
describe it as "slight, minute, small or minimal."38 Two 
survey participants reported more detailed findings, as a 
Minnesota medical center claimed "100 percent of those eligible 
to retire at 65 have elected to stay on at least part-time," 
and an eastern government agency reported that of those now 
retiring, 39 "5 percent" are older than 65 years of age. 
The survey confirms the findings of the researchers at 
Portland State university, and the testimony of Congressional 
witnesses relative to the initial impact of the legislation. 
Although few retirement age workers are remaining in the labor 
force, the BNA study found many employers still feel the overall 
impact of the legislation is yet to be determined. Perhaps 
the most immediate impact has been on the personnel depart-
ments of many large firms now faced with a need to determine 
the individual retirement decisions of workers, as well as 
to develop more complete performance appraisal systems. The 
BNA survey identified a wide range of responses to the approach-
es of many firms on the adjustments that many companies are 
making to accomodate their older workers. 
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CHAPTER V 
ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEA 
The policy implications of most legislative actions are 
difficult to completely anticipate. Social legislation, by 
its very nature , is complex to evaluate because it seeks to 
change behavior. Viewed within this context , social legis-
lation will usually stand in direct contradistinction to 
many existing traditions currently embraced throughout society. 
Clearly, the historical forces toward early retirement, which 
have virtually made early retirement a social goal, will not 
be completely reversed in the short run. 
The retirement decision is a very complex and personal 
decision for both employers and employees. While a worker ' s 
job performance is undoubtedly a critical variable in this 
relationship, a worker ' s financial resources are no less 
important . Historical patterns toward early retirement have 
developed during an era characterized by increases in worker 
productivity and low rates of inflation. In essence, these 
forces are closely intertwined in a complex set of relation-
ships only briefly delineated in this paper. 
The research objectives that guided this policy analysis 
were intended to measure the short-term impacts of the 
legislation on job mobility for younger workers, women and 
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minorities and to measure the long-term impacts on the 
retirement decision of workers under the assumption of con-
tinuing high rates o f inflat i on . To accomplish these objectives, 
a mail survey was conducted of 107 manufacturing firms located 
in the state of Rhode Island. The sampling plan involved a 
stratified sampling methodology of firms involved in the 
production of goods from SIC Code 20 to 39, excluding SIC 21 
and 29 . , (See Appendix A, Survey Instrument, Introductory 
Postcard, Introductory Letter and Followup Letter) 
The survey instrument was administered during the month 
of February 1981 using the three-step methodology delineated 
in Appendix B . (See Appendix B, Survey Methodology) About 
one week a f ter the post cards were mailed, the surveys were 
sent out . During the third week, the followup letter was 
mailed, extending the survey schedule to three weeks. Results 
were then punched onto cards and tabulated using the Statistical 
Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). 
The response rate for the survey was excellent . Of the 
107 surveys mailed, 83 were returned providing a 79 percent 
response rate . The high response rate for this survey, while 
difficult to pre c isely i dentify , seems attributable to the 
methodology employed as well as to a particularly fortunate 
event. During the week the surveys were mailed, "The Prov-
idence Evening Bulletin" ran a front page article (February 
12 , 1981) entitled "Mandatory Pension Plans , Older Retirement 
Report" which discussed the findings of the President ' s Com-
mission on Pension Policy and highlighted the proposed changes 
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in retirement policy. Although it is difficult to measure 
the influence of such an unanticipated event, the article 
is mentioned because it may have contributed to the high 
response rate. 
The responses displayed in the following table indicate 
that four SIC codes (20, 26, 28 and 39) reported 100 percent 
coverage a s all six (6) firms in those industries returned 
their surveys. No SIC code reported under 50 percen t coverage. 
The fir ms included in the sample employed over 12,400 people 
or approximately 10 percent of the total manufacturing work-
force of Rhode Island. 
TABLE V-1 
Completed Surveys .£y_ SIC Code 
SIC Title SIC Code 
Food and Kindred Products 20 
Textile Mill Products 22 
Apparel and Other Textile Products 23 
Lumber and Wood Products 24 
Furniture and Fixtures 25 
Paper and Allied Products 26 
Printing and Publishing 27 
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 
Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 30 
Leather and Leather Products 31 
Stone, Clay and Glass Products 32 
Primary Metal Products 33 
Fabricated Metal Products 34 
Machinery, Except Electrical 35 
Electric and Electronic Equipment 36 
Transportation Equipment 37 
Instruments and Related Products 38 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 39 
Completed 
Surveys 
6 
4 
4 
4 
3 
6 
5 
6 
4 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
4 
6 
Total 83 
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Perhaps the most significant observation that can be 
made about the survey respones is that there was a remark-
able homogeneity in the distribution of mu c h of the information . 
The following table clearly illustrates this point, as there 
was virtually no difference in the responses to the survey 
by small, medium and large firms . While the original sampling 
plan was designed to include one-third of the sample from 
small, medium and large firms , the survey results clos ely 
parallel this distribution . 
TABLE V-2 
Av e rage Employment of Surveyed Firms 
Firm Size 
4 to 19 employees 
20 to 99 employees 
100 or more 
Total 
Number 
25 
31 
27 
83 
Percent 
30.1% 
37.4 
32 . 5 
Firms employing 100 or more workers represented nearly 
one-third of the total sample, while small firms employin g 
between 4 and 19 workers represented a slightly smaller total . 
Firms with 20 to 99 workers represented the great~st number 
of survey r esponses. Thus, the distribution o f survey 
responses closely parallels the original sampling plan wi nhout 
a great deal of variation. 
The distribution of firms by the numb er of years they have 
been in business displays more variation. As the next table 
illustrates, firms with less than 5 years in business represent 
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the smallest proportion, as only 4 percent of the total is 
comprised of this group. The largest group, comprisin g 
elmost one out of three firms, was represented by firms with 
between 26 and 50 years in business. This question was 
included with the expectation that it would serve as an 
indicator of the age distribution of the labor force of the 
firms included in the sample. 
TABLE V-3 
Years in Business for Surveyed Firms 
less than 5 years 
6 to 10 years 
11 t o 25 years 
26 to 50 years 
more than 50 years 
No response 
Total 
Number 
3 
12 
20 
27 
20 
1 
83 
Percent 
3.6% 
14.5 
24.1 
32.5 
24.1 
1 • 2 
The information presented in Table V-3 shows that 
47 firms or 57 percent of the sample have been in business 
for more than 25 years, suggesting that the sample contains 
a significant number of firms which should also have large 
numbers of older workers. 
Table V-4 displays information with regard to the 
past policies ori mandatory retirement for the firms included 
in the sample. As the table illustrates, nearly 16 percent 
of the firms in the sample had a mandatory retirement age 
for employees. 
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TABLE V-4 
Mandatory Retirement Policies 
Question: In 1977, did your firm have a mandatory retire-
ment age for any of its workers? 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Number 
13 
70 
83 
Percent 
15.7% 
84.3 
Significantly, mandatory retirement policies are strongly 
associated with the size of the firm's workforce. While this 
may seem an obvious conclusion, the firms included in the 
sample clearly show that as the size of the firm increases, 
the incidence of mandatory retirement age policies also 
increases. The following table shows the relationship 
between the size of the firm and the incidence of mandatory 
retirement policies. 
TABLE V-5 
CROSSTABULATION 
Mandatory Retirement Policies .£y Firm Size 
Mandatory Retirement Firm Size 
Policy 4-19 20-99 100 or more 
Yes 1 3 9 
No 24 28 18 
Total 25 31 27 
Note : x 2 = 9.79* 
*Significant at .01 
Total 
13 
70 
83 
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Additional analysis of the distribution of mandatory 
retirement policies by firms producing durable goods (SIC 
24, 25, and 32 through 39) and non-durable goods (SIC 20, 
22, 23 and 26 through 31) did not indicate any relationship 
between mandatory retirement policies and these SIC categories. 
Retirement age policies were applied to both white collar 
workers and blue collar workers, although three respondents 
with mandatory retirement age policies did not subject 
white collar workers to the same retirement policies as were 
blue collar workers. White collar workers were most likely 
to be madatorily retired at age 65, evidence of the instit-
utionalization of age 65 as the normal retirement age. 
TABLE V-6 
Retiremen t ~ for White Collar Workers 
Question: At what age were white collar workers mandatorily 
retired? 
Age 65 
No retirement age 
Total 
Number 
10 
3 
13 
Percent 
77 
23 
Retirement age policy for white collar workers was 
predominate l y determined by the pension or profit sharing 
plan offerred by the company or by company policy . Relatively 
few white collar workers were subject to a mandatory retire-
ment policy that was collectively bargained, a finding 
consistent with the fact that many white collar workers are 
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not unionized. 
TABLE V-7 
How Was This Retirement Age Determined 
Question: Was this mandatory retirement age part of a: 
Pension or profit sharing plan 
Company policy 
Collectively bargained union contract 
Both pension and company policy 
Both company policy and collectively 
bargained 
Don 't Know or No Response 
Total 
Number 
3 
4 
1 
2 
2 
1 
13 
Percent 
23 
31 
8 
15 
15 
8 
Firms with a mandatory retirement age in 1977 all 
required blue collar workers to retire at age 65 . No other 
ages were identified for blue collar workers . 
TABLE V-8 
Retirement ~ for Blue Collar Workers 
Question: At what age were blue collar workers mandat~rily 
retired? 
Age 65 
Other ages 
Total 
Number 
13 
0 
13 
Percent 
100 
0 
In addition to not having an alternative retirement age, 
blue collar workers were also more likely to have had their 
retirement age established as part of a collectively bargained 
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union contract. The following table indicates how the retire-
ment age for blue collar workers was established. 
TABLE V-9 
How Was This Retirement ~ Determined 
Question: Was this mandatory retirement age part of a: 
Pension or profit sharing plan 
Company policy 
Collectively bargained union contract 
Both pension and company policy 
Total 
Number 
3 
4 
4 
2 
13 
Percent 
23 
31 
31 
15 
Since the passage of the ADEA Amendments of 1978, firms 
which previously had mandatory retirement policies have 
modified their retirement policies. As might be expected, 
most firms simply substituted age 70 for age 65. The 
following table displays information on how the firms surveyed 
responded to the changes legislated in 1978. 
TABLE V-10 
How Firms Have Modified Their Retirement Age 
Question: How have you modified, or how do you intend to 
modify the mandatory age in order to comply with 
the changes in retirement age policy? Have you 
or will you: 
Increase to age 70 
Increase to past age 70 
Abolish it entirely 
Leave the age unchanged 
No Response 
Total 
Number 
9 
0 
1 
1 
2 
13 
Percent 
70 
0 
8 
8 
15 
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Nearly 70 percent of the firms with a mandatory retire-
ment policy simply increased the age of retirement to 70 
years of age. Only one firm completely abolished the age 
and one firm, in apparent violation of the law, has not 
changed its mandatory retirement age. 
Significantly, a majority of firms with a mandatory 
retirement age policy believe that employees would choose 
to work past age 65. Nearly 70 percent of the firms believe 
that some employees would extend their worklife, as displayed 
in the following table. 
TABLE V-11 
Do You Expect Employees .!_£ Work Past Age &2 
Question: In the next few years do you expect any of your 
employees to choose to work past the age of 65? 
Yes 
No 
Not Sure 
Total 
Number 
9 
2 
2 
13 
Percent 
70 
15 
15 
When questioned further about whether any specific 
group or groups of employees would be more likely to work 
longer, employers responded with less certainty. The following 
table summarizes the responses of employers to the question 
of whether certain groups of employees will work longer. 
Question: 
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TABLE V-12 
Will Certain Groups Work Longer 
Do you expect any particular group of your 
employees to work longer than other groups? 
Number Percent 
Yes 
No 
Not Sure 
Total 
6 
4 
3 
13 
46 
31 
23 
Significantly, no respondent felt that blue collar 
workers, defined as craft workers, laborers, operatives or 
service workers, were likely to extend their worklife. This 
is significant because in manufacturing industries, the majority 
of the workforce is employed in blue collar occupations. 
However , white collar workers, particularly executives, were 
expected to continue working past age 65. Other groups of 
employees were expected to remain in the workforce and the 
following table displays the expected distribution. 
TABLE V-13 
Groups Expected .!.!?_ Remain in the Workforce Past Age &2_ 
Question: Which particular group do you expect to work longer? 
Executives 
Managers 
Technical workers 
Clerical workers 
Blue collar workers 
Executives and sales workers 
Technical and clerical workers 
Number 
3 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
Percent 
37.5 
12.5 
0 
12.5 
0 
12. 5 
12.5 
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Generally, respondents believed that white collar 
workers were more likely to remain in the workforce for 
longer periods of time . Again, this conclusion could have 
been anticipated as white collar jobs are generally less 
physically demanding than are many blue collar occupations. 
In contrast to the 13 firms that had a mandatory retire-
ment age for their employees in 19 7 7, 70 firms did not 
mandatorily retire workers. In fact, 50 f i rms or 71 percent 
of those firms without a mandatory retirement age policy in 
1977 imdicated they previously had workers remain past age 
65 . The following table illustrates the distribution of 
firms which did not mandatorily retire workers. 
TABLE V-14 
Firms Which Allowed Workers to Work Past Age £2 
Question: Have you previously had any employees work 
past age 65? 
Number Percent 
Yes 50 71 
No 17 24 
Not Sure 1 1 
No Response 2 3 
Total 70 
A significant number of firms had neither a mandatory 
retirement age policy nor any experience with workers remain-
ing in the workforce beyond age 65, suggesting the powerful 
influence of age 65 as the normal retirement age for workers . 
The information in the above table clearly supports the long-
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term trend for workers to leave the labor force at age 65, 
as nearly one firm in four, without the artifical constraint 
of a formal retirement age, has not had any workers remain 
past age 65. 
When the employers who did have workers remain past age 
65 were asked to indicate what percent elected to work longer, 
fully 70 percent claimed that no more than 10 percent remained 
past age 65. The following table illustrates the distribution 
of workers that have remained past age 65. 
TABLE V-15 
Percent of Workers Age &2_ Who Have Kept Working 
Question: 
1 to 
11 to 
26 to 
51 to 
76 to 
Don't 
Approximately what percent of your employees 
who reached 65 elected to work longer? 
Number Percent 
10 percent 35 70 
25 percent 2 4 
50 percent 3 6 
75 percent 1 2 
100 percent 3 6 
Know 3 6 
Total 50 
Interestingly, some employers indicated that workers in 
certain specialized crafts, such as molder and coremakers, 
were encouraged to work longer because it was difficult to 
find younger workers with equivalent skills. Other employers 
noted that many older workers have better work habits and 
productive capability than do younger workers and these older 
workers are encouraged to remain as long as they are physically 
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capable of working. The 6 firms that indicated that between 
76 and 100 percent of their workforce had remained past age 
65 were closely examined but did not display any distinctive 
characteristics that would help explain why such a large 
percentage of workers remained past age 65. 
When employers were asked whether any group of their 
workers would remain in the workforce past age 65, they 
responded with a comparable but higher percentage distribution 
than did employers that did not have any workers remain past 
age 65. As indicated in the following table, 46 percent of 
employers with a mandatory retirement policy believed that 
certain groups would remain in the workforce. The next table 
illustrates how employers who did not have a mandatory retire-
ment policy and, hence, have had experience with workers 
remaining past age 65, expect workers to participate in the 
labor force. 
Question: 
TABLE V-16 
Will Certain Groups Work Longer 
Do you expect any group of your employees to 
want to work longer than others? 
Yes 
No 
Not Sure 
Total 
Number 
31 
34 
5 
70 
Percent 
44 
49 
7 
As ·· the table illustrates, 44 percent of employers without 
a mandatory retirement age for their workers expect certain 
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groups to remain in the workforce. When combined with the 
information provided by employers that had a mandatory retire-
ment age policy, nearly 45 percent of all employers expect 
some workers, as a group, to remain in the labor force beyond 
age 65. 
In speculating which groups of workers would be expected 
to work longer , employers without a mandatory retirement age 
policy fully anticipate that executives would most likely 
want to remain past age 65 . This conclusion is consistent 
with the expectation of firms which did have a mandatory 
retirement age policy . While the 1978 ADEA Amendments required 
mandatory retirement at age 65 for chief executives of a 
company , specifically those in the upper echelons eligible 
for an annual pension in excess of $27,000, not all executives 
are affected . Thus , the finding that many executives will 
remain past age 65 is con s idered significant as competition 
for these positions from younger workers is likely to intensify 
in the years ahead. The following table shows the frequency 
with which respondents predicted that executives would work 
past age 65. 
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TABLE V-17 
Groups Expected ~ Remain in the Workforce Past ~ .§.2. 
Question: Which particular group do you expect to work 
longer? 
Executives 
Clerical workers 
Blue collar workers 
Sales workers 
Executives , managers and technical 
Executives , managers, technical and 
clerical 
Executives , managers and sales 
Executives and managers 
Executives and blue collar workers 
Managers and blue collar workers 
Managers , technical, clerical and blue 
collar 
All workers 
Total 
Number Percent 
7 20.0 
2 2.8 
6 17.0 
1 2 . 8 
2 5. 7 
3 8 .5 
1 2.8 
6 17.0 
1 2.8 
1 2.8 
1 2.8 
1 2.8 
35 
In addition to the large number of responses predicting 
that executives will work past age 65, managers, technical 
workers and clerical workers are all expected to work past 
age 65. Significaat numbers of blue collar workers are 
expected to remain in the workforce, unlike the finding of 
employers with retirement age policies, possibly a result 
of the fact that employers who did not have a mandatory 
retirement age policy have had experience with older workers 
remaining past age 65, and are in a better position to 
identify which groups of workers are likely to remain past 
age 65. When taken together, 42 employers or approximately 
51 percent of all those surveyed felt that some groups of 
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employees were likely to remain in the workforce past age 
65. 
The foregoing questions were primarily concerned with 
identifying the previous experience employers have had with 
mandatory retirement policies. The next section of the 
questionairre asked employers to estimate the impacts they 
expected from the changes brought about by the 1978 ADEA 
Amendments and their opinion of the proposed changes. 
Employers were first asked whether mandatory retirement 
will be abolished nationally, in an attempt to guage both 
their expectations about the future of mandatory retirement 
and the potential impacts of increasing the age beyond age 70. 
TABLE V-18 
Will Mandatory Retirement Be Abolished 
Question: Nationally, do you expect mandatory retirement 
to be abolished entirely? 
Number Percent 
Yes 45 55 
No 26 32 
Not Sure 11 13 
No Response 1 1 
Total 83 
As the table illustrates, over 50 percent of all 
employers believe that mandatory retirement will be abolished. 
When combined with information from the next table, it can 
be concluded that not only do the majority of employers 
expect mandatory retirement to be abolished, but they do 
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not expect the abolition of mandatory retirement to have a 
significant impact on their firm. 
TABLE V-19 
Affect of Abolishing Mandatory Retirement 
Question: If the mandatory retirement age were to be abolished 
entirely, what affect would it have on your company? 
Number Percent 
Great Affect 2 2.4 
Moderate Affect 5 6.0 
Some Affect 8 9.6 
Little Affect 26 31. 3 
No Affect 35 4 2. 2 
Don't Know 7 8.4 
Total 83 
Only 18 percent of the respondents believed that abolishing 
mandatory retirement would have any substantial impact on their 
companies. The overwhelming majority believe that removing the 
upper limit for workers would have little or no impact on their 
company. To a large extent, this conclusion is supported by the 
fact that relatively few firms (13 or 16 percent) had a mand-
atory retirement age policy in 1977. Thus, "uncapping " the 
age of retirement does not pose any substantial threat to most 
employers. 
However, firms with a mandatory retirement age in 1977 were 
more likely to predict that abolishing mandatory retirement 
woul d have a significant impact . This could have been antici-
pated, as those firms with a mandatory retirement age have not 
had the experience of allowing older workers the option of 
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workin g lon g er. Thus, the y ar e not sure of wh at the demand 
to work lon g er will be. The next table displays this re-
lationship. 
Note: 
TABLE V-20 
CROSSTABULATION 
Retirement Policy E_y Affect if Abolished 
Mandatory Retirement 
Policy 
Yes 
No 
Total 
x2 = 13.32* 
Affect if 
Abolished 
Great, Moderate Little, None 
Some Don't Kno w 
7 6 
8 62 
15 68 
*Significant at .01 
In attempting to guage the age of retirement for both 
white collar and blue collar workers, and therefore the 
potential i mpact of abolishing the age of mandatory retire-
ment, respondents were asked to indicate what percent of 
white collar and blue collar workers retire before age 65. 
Over 5 out of every 8 employers claim that less than 10 
percent of their white collar workers retire before age 65. 
While nearly 25 percent of the respondents were unable to 
provide an estimate to this question, it seems clear that 
relatively few white collar workers retire before a g e 65. 
-67-
TABLE V-21 
White Collar Workers that Retire Before Age ..§2_ 
Question: Regarding employees who presently retire prior 
to age 65, approximately what percentage of 
your white collar (professional, technical, 
managers and administrators, sales workers and 
clerical) workers retire prior to age 65? 
Number Percent 
None 38 45.8 
1 to 10 percent 18 21. 7 
11 to 25 percent 3 3.6 
26 to so percent 4 4 . 8 
51 to 75 percent () 0 
76 to 100 percent 1 1. 2 
Don ' t Know 19 
Total 83 
In contrast to the distribution of retirement age 
for white collar workers , blue collar workers are ~ore likely 
to retire before age 65 than are white collar workers. 
TABLE V-22 
Blue Collar Workers that Retire Before Age ..§2_ 
Que stion: Regarding your blue collar workers (craft workers, 
operatives , laborers and service workers) what 
percentage retire prior to age 65? 
Number J'_~_i;: cent 
None 26 31. 3 
1 to 10 percent 22 26 . 5 
11 to 25 percent 5 6 . 0 
26 to 50 percent 5 6 . 0 
51 to 75 percent 4 4 . 8 
76 to 100 percent 3 3 . 6 
Don ' t Know 18 21. 7 
Total 83 
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While 56 employers claimed that less than 10 percent 
of their white collar workers retired before age 65, 48 
employers claimed that less than 10 percent of their blue 
collar workers retired before age 65. Blue collar workers 
were more likely than white collar workers to retire before 
age 65 in nearly every percentage category. The following 
crosstabulation suggests that early retirement, before age 
65, is more likely for blue collar workers. 
TABLE V-23 
CROSSTABULATION 
Early Retirement 
by 
White Collar and Blue Collar Workers 
White Collar workers 
Blue Collar workers 
Total 
Note: x2 = 3.85* 
*Significant at .05 
Less than More than 
10 Percent 10 Percent 
56 8 
48 17 
104 25 
Total 
64 
65 
129 
Thus, early retirement before age 65 seems to be more 
common for blue collar workers. Again, this conclusion is 
consistent with the employer's expectation that white collar 
workers are more likely to work longer. 
In attempting to estimate the likelihood that older 
workers would be allowed to ease gradually into retirement 
through such personnel policies as flextime, part-time options 
or job redesigµ, respondents were asked to indicate if they 
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allowed any of these options. 
Question: 
TABLE V-24 
Personnel Policies for Older Workers 
In order to structure worktime so that older 
workers may ease gradually into retirement, 
various plans have been suggested such as 
flextime, part-time options, job redesign, 
increased vacation time, etc. Has your firm 
considered or adapted plans to help older 
workers gradually ease into retirement? 
Number Percent 
Yes 18 22 
No 59 71 
Don ' t Know 6 7 
Total 83 
Nearly one quarter of those surveyed indicated that 
they had adopted personnel policies designed to assist older 
workers in preparing for retirement. The employers using 
flexible personnel policies were nearly un a nimous in their 
use of part-time options for workers. Generally, employers 
indicated that workers could combine reduced hours with a 
reduced work week • . One respondent indicated that older 
workers also could change assignments to a less strenuous 
one, and another respondent claimed the union representing 
workers at his firm would not allow part-time options for 
older workers. 
The question of whether employers will allow their 
workers about to retire the option of remaining, if only on 
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a part-time basis, is considered very important. As previously 
mentioned, Social Security is designed to provide incentives, 
amounting to 1/4 of 1 percent for each month between the ages 
of 65 and 72 for which an individual defers retirement, 
providing in effect for an increase of 3 percent per year 
for each year a worker delays retirement. In addition, the 
earnings test has been increased to $5,500 and will be 
completely abolished for everyone over 70 years of age. Thus, 
these two changes are expected to increase the likelihood that 
older workers will remain in the workforce, thereby decreasing 
the job opportunities for younger workers and simultaneously 
depressing relative wages for younger workers. 
quarter of the employers in the sample already 
Nearly one 
allow workers 
the option of remaining in the workforce in some reduced 
capacity, increasing the possibility that opportunities for 
younger workers will be reduced. 
When employers were questioned about whether long term 
historical trends toward early retirement would be changed, 
they were evenly split in their expectation concerning this 
trend. The following table displays the responses of 
employers to the question of early retirement. 
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TABLE V-25 
Expect Changes in National Trend Toward Early Retirement 
Question: In recent years many men and women have elected 
to retire before age 65, particularly at age 62, 
when reduced Social Security benefits first 
become available. Do you expect any changes in 
this national trend toward early retirement? 
Number Percent 
Yes 33 40 
No 34 41 
Don't Know 16 19 
Total 83 
Significant numbers of employers do think that historical 
changes will in fact be altered, and that workers will remain 
in the workforce past age 65. At least one employer indicated 
that higher living costs would force more older workers to 
remain in the labor force. When questioned further, employers 
also believe that both men and women will woLk for longer 
periods of time. 
TABLE V-26 
Expect Different Work Patterns for Men and Women 
Question: If yes, do you think there will be any differences 
in the work patterns of men as opposed to the work 
patterns of women? 
Yes, more men will work 
longer 
Yes, more women will 
work longer 
Both sexes will work 
longer 
Number 
8 
1 
25 
Percent 
24 
3 
73 
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Thus, employers that expect historical trends toward 
early retirement to be changed perceive these changes 
to work across the board for all employees. 
However, employers, while expecting more workers to 
work lon ger , are not in favor of having all workers to be 
required to work longer. When presented with a question on 
raising the age of eligibility for full Social Security 
benefits to age 68, fully 57 percent of all employers opposed 
raising the age of eligibility. While one-third of the sample 
did agree that the age of eligibility should be raised, a 
significant proportion did not agree that the age should be 
increased. 
TABLE V-27 
Increasing the Eligible Age for Social Security Benefits 
Question : Last year (19 80 ) the U.S. Secretary of Commerce 
proposed increasing the age at which Social 
Security benefits are available to age 68. 
Would you be: 
Strongly in favor 
Moderately in favor 
Somewhat in favor 
Moderately opposed 
Strongly opposed 
Don't Know 
Total 
Number 
12 
8 
10 
13 
34 
6 
83 
Percent 
15 
10 
12 
16 
41 
7 
The relatively strong opposition to increasing the 
age of eligibility for Social Security benefits is somewhat 
surprising, as much has been written on the need to redesign 
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the Social Security system. Perhaps the opposition to 
increasing the age of eligibility is best understood within 
the context of the employee appraisal systems that most 
employers utilize. The following table shows that over 
three quarters of all employers do not have a formal employee 
appraisal mechanism . 
TABLE V-28 
Employee Appraisal System 
Question: How would you characterize your employee perform-
ance system? 
Number Percent 
Formal 12 15 
Informal 63 76 
Don't Know 8 10 
Total 83 
Thus, it can be concluded that the majority of employers 
do not have a formal mechanism to evaluate the performance 
of th~ir employees, a •. significant finding that helps to 
explain why many employers would be opposed to increasing 
the age of eligibility for Social Security benefits. It is 
also somewhat surprising to find that only 15 percent of 
the sample had a formal employee appraisal system, since 
recent legal activity at both the federal and state levels 
has emphasized the need for objective employee appraisal 
systems to support unbiased personnel practices. If large 
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numbers of older workers were suddenly to decide to remain 
in the workforce, it is conceivable that most employers 
would be unable, except in an informal context, to decide 
who should be allowed to work. Thus, it is likely that given 
changes in the age of Social Security eligibility and other 
areas of retirement policy, older workers will be more inclined 
to seek legal remedies in the event they are discharged from 
their jobs. To some extent this has already eccurred, as 
the Commission for Human Rights has had numerous age discrim-
ination complaints against manufacturing firms. 
The majority of employers do not expect to apply their 
employee performance appraisal practices more rigorously 
because of the 1978 ADEA Amendments. In large measure, this 
should be expected as few firms even have a formal process. 
Question: 
TABLE V-29 
Effect on Employee Appraisal Systems 
Do you expect your firm to apply its performance 
appraisal practices more rigorously in the future 
because of the changes in retirement age policy? 
Number Percent 
Yes 6 7 
No 68 82 
Don't Know 9 11 
Total 83 
In fact, the six respondents claimed that their perform-
ance appraisal practices were to be more rigorously applied 
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to protect the c ompany from " incompetant " workers, to 
increase productivity and to assure proper records . There 
was no discernible pattern among employers with respect to 
applying their employee appraisal systems in light of the 
19 78 ADEA Amendments. 
The apparent lack of a formal employee performance 
appraisal system on the part of many firms is also demon-
strated in the lack of a formal process to provide retraining 
for employees. Many employers , 13 o r 16 percent of those 
sampled , indicate that they provide retraining by sending 
employees to conferences, seminars and conventions with a 
simil a r n umbe r o f employers, 14 or 17 p ercent, ind icating 
t hat t hey p a y for edu c ational courses taken by employees . 
Still other employers provide for their retraining needs 
by hiring consultants to provide "in-house " train i ng or by 
on-the-job training. However , 52 employers or 63 percent, 
do not provide retraining by any f o rmal process . 
The following table illustrates the distribution of 
respon s es to the question of how employers provide for 
the retraining needs of their employees . 
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TABLE V-30 
How Q.£_ You Provide Retraining 
Question: How do you provide for the retraining needs of 
your employees? 
Send to conferences, seminars 
or conventions 
Pay for educational courses 
Hire consultants to provide 
workshops 
Other 
Conferences, educational 
courses and consultants 
Conferences, educational 
courses, consultants and 
other 
Conferences and educational 
courses 
No formal process 
Don't Know 
Total 
Number 
4 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
6 
52 
6 
83 
Percent 
4. 8 
6.0 
4. 8 
3.6 
2.4 
1. 2 
7 . 2 
62.7 
7. 2 
Generally, it can be concluded that most firms do not 
have a formal procedure either to evaluate an employees's 
job performance or to provide for any additional job training 
or job retraining. 
In addition to the retraining of all workers, employers 
were asked if there were any specific occupations or trades 
in which they sought to retrain older workers. As might be 
expected, very few employers specifically geared any 
training programs specifically for older workers. 
Question: 
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TABLE V-31 
Retrain Older Workers 
In your firm are there any specific occupations 
or trades in which you strive to retrain workers 
age 65 and older? 
Number Percent 
Yes 8 9.6 
No 61 73.5 
Not Sure 14 16.9 
Total 83 
It can be concluded that retraining older workers 
will not pose a substantial impediment to job opportunities 
for younger workers , as less than one employer in ten seeks 
to retrain workers age 65 and older. 
An identical number of employers also believe that 
retraining older workers will block lines of advancement 
for workers. The internal competition was specifically 
identified by a number of respondents to involve management, 
technical workers and unskilled workers. However, the 
majority of employers do not provide retraining specifically 
for older workers and would therefore not expect any signif-
icant decrease in opportunities for other workers . 
Question: 
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TABLE V-32 
Will Retraining Block Advancement 
Do you anticipate that retraining older workers 
to age 70 will block lines of advancement within 
any specific occupation or among certain ty pes 
of workers? 
Number Percent 
Yes 8 9.6 
No 41 49.4 
Don ' t Know 34 41.0 
Total 83 
Although large firms of 100 or more employees perceived 
that retraining older workers would block lines of advance-
ment for other workers with a greater freque rl cy than did 
other, smaller firms, no significant relationship was found 
to exist. 
However, when employers who expected that retraining 
older workers would block advancement were compared by SIC 
code disaggregated into durable and non-durable industries, 
a significant relationship was found. It appears that 
firms producing durable goods were likely to view retraining 
older workers as a threat to the job opportunities of workers. 
To some extent this relationship might have been expected, 
as the durable goods industries have been particularly hard 
hit during the last fe w years and are likely to view any 
polic y chan ges t hat sugg est t h at retir ement for work ers will 
b e post p one d to advers e ly affect job o pportunities for 
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workers. The relationship is shown in the following table. 
Will Re trainin g 
Durable 
Non-durable 
Note: x 2 = 4.516": 
*Significant at . OS 
TABLE V-33 
CROSSTABULA'l'IO N 
Bloak Advancement 
Yes 
goods 7 
goods 1 
Total 8 
h SIC Code 
Ho Total 
36 43 
39 l~ 0 
75 83 
Thus, the industry in which a firm is classified seems 
to be a better predictor of whether retraining will block 
advancement than does a firm's size. 
When employers were asked to identify the effect t he 
ADEA will have on hiring older workers , fully 83 percent of 
the employers believed they would not chan g e their p re sent 
policies. Only 6 percent felt they would hire more older 
workers and less than 4 percent believed they would hire 
fewer older workers. As the next table illustrates, firms 
expect to continue past hiring practices and do not display 
any significant movement toward hiring more older workers . 
Question: 
-80-
TABLE V-34 
Policies Toward Hiring Older Workers 
What effect do you expect the changes in 
retirement age to have on your organization's 
policies toward hiring ol der worke rs. Will 
your firm: 
Hire more older workers 
Not change hiring policies 
Hire fewer older workers 
Don ' t Know 
Total 
Number 
5 
69 
3 
6 
83 
Percent 
6. 0 
8 3. 1 
3 . 6 
7.2 
The pre c eedin g discussion indicates that many employers 
have not experienced any significant impacts f~om the 1978 
ADEA Amendments. In an effort to guage the future implications 
of the 1978 amendments , employers were asked to evaluate the 
retirement decision of their workers under the assumption 
that the high inflation rates of the past few years would 
continue . This question is considered a critical question 
in the survey, as it is assumed that it will predict the 
future behavior of workers. 
To a large extent , the responses provided in the 
following table p o rtend a reversal of historical patterns 
toward early retirement. As discussed in previous chapters, 
labor force participation rates have been declining for all 
workers, with age 65 as the age when many employees retire . 
However, early retirement before age 65 had been becoming more 
of the norm for most workers, and, in fact, the trend was 
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toward retirement at an age earlier than 65 . 
TABLE V-35 
Inflation and the Retirement Decision 
Question: Continued high inflation rates may result in 
employees choosin g to remain in the labor force 
past early and/or normal retirement ages . If 
inflation continues at the present rate, what 
affect would you expect it to have on the retire-
ment decisions of the o lder worker in your organ-
ization? Would they: 
Forego early retirement 
Retire at the normal retirement 
age 
Wish to continue work i ng past 
the normal retirement age 
Not change their retirement 
plans 
Both forego early retiremen t 
and work past the normal 
retirement age 
Don ' t Know 
Total 
Number 
13 
11 
32 
11 
5 
11 
83 
Percent 
15. 7 
13.3 
38.6 
13.3 
6.0 
13.3 
The significance of the above information is that 73 
percent of all respondents believe that und e r continued high 
ra t es of inflation, workers will not elect earl y retirement. 
In addition, Table V-25 clearly showed that 34 employers, 
or 41 percent, did not expect that the national trend toward 
early retirement would be changed. Inflation can then be 
said to be an important variable in the retirement decision. 
Since retirement for most workers is characterized by 
a period of dissavings, that is workers must adjust t heir 
lifestyle to a reduced income level, it is also a time when 
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the financial resources of a worker begin to be diminished. 
Again, previous chapters have outlined the powerful influence 
inflation has on a worker's retirement income, particularly 
if the retiree has a pension that is not indexed to changes 
in the cost of living. It would be reasonable to assume 
that under high rates of inflation which exist for long 
periods of time, exactly the situation we have experienced 
over the last decade, workers would re-evaluate their decision 
to retire and, if possible, postpone that decision for as 
long as possible. 
Not only do the majority of employers believe workers 
will not retire at an early age, but a majority of employers 
also believe that workers will retire either at the normal 
age or work beyond the normal retirement age. 
Attempts to isolate variables that would influence 
this decision proved unsuccessful. Crosstabulations did 
not produce any significant relationships. Thus, it is 
concluded that these trends away from both earl, and normal 
retirement exist across the board for all firms included 
in the survey. 
When employers were queried on the impact that the 
ADEA will have on different groups of employees, there were 
significant differences in the expected impact. Employers 
were asked to rate the affect on job opportunities for younger 
workers, women, minorities and older workers , using a scale 
from "great effect" to "no effect." The following table 
summarizes the responses to job opportunities for all four 
groups. 
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TABLE V-36 
Impact on Job Opportunities for Different Groups 
Question : 
Group 
Since retirement age policy now prohi~its mandatory 
retirement before age 70, job opportunities for 
various groups of your employees may be affected. 
Opportunities for some may be reduced, while 
opportunities for others may be increased . Using 
a scale from great effect to no effect, please 
indicate the extent to which you expect job 
opportunities to be effected in your firm. Please 
use t he following codes: 1-Great Effect; 2-Moderate 
Effect; 3-Some Effect; 4-Little effect; 5-No Effect; 
6-Don't Know . 
Great 
# % 
Effect 
Moderate 
# % 
Don 't 
Some Little None Know 
# % # % # % # % 
Younger workers 5 6 9 11 9 11 21 25 29 35 10 11 
Minorities 2 2 5 6 10 12 17 21 38 46 11 13 
Women 2 2 3 4 5 6 23 28 39 47 11 13 
Older workers 6 7 12 15 4 5 15 18 35 42 11 13 
As the table illustrates, younger workers are perceived 
to be most affected by the changes in retirement age policy. 
Over one-fourth of all employers believed that younger 
workers would, to some extent, have reduced job opportunities 
as a result of the ADEA. A similar estimate exists for older 
workers, as 22 employers or 28 percent, believed that job 
opportunities for older workers would be reduced to some 
extent. At this point, it should be stated that the construction 
of the question may have confused some of the respondents 
into thinking that the question allowed an answer as to which 
g roup experienced an increase in job opportunitiesm which it 
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did not. Thus , the responses only for older workers are 
not considered reliable. Only one in five employers esti-
mated any impact for minority workers and one in eight 
employers believed that women would be affe cted. 
Extensive crosstabulations were conducted to determine 
if there were any variable sets that would serve as a 
predictor of differential impacts. These crosstabulations 
were conducted using the estimated job opportunity impact 
as the dependent variable. Independent variables were SIC 
code, average employment, years in business, retirement 
decision under high inflatio n and employee appraisal systems. 
Cro ss tabulations were run for all four employee groups with 
no significant relationships emerging. 
The most significant finding of these analyses concerned 
the lack of any independent variable that served to indicate 
a relationship between employers and their estimate of how 
job opportunities will be affected. To the extent that the 
survey results are representative of the manufacturing com-
munity, it can be posited that the impacts will be felt across 
the board by all manufact un ing firms, regardless of SIC code, 
years in business or other characteristics. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the ADEA will impact 
younger workers most significantly . Additionally, minorities 
and women are not expected to be adversely affected by the 
ADEA, with women the least expected group to be affected . 
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CHAPTER VI 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In attempting to develop the policy implications of 
this analysis, a number of important observations can be 
made . First, mandatory retirement policies were not as 
widespread as might be expected . Only 16 percent of the 
sample reported a mandatory retirement policy in 1977, 
with a significant rel a tionship found to exist between the 
size of the firm and its probability to have a mandatory 
retir e ment policy . As noted previously, Rhode Island has 
a greater proportion than the national average of manufact-
uring firms employing fewer than 100 workers, which undoubt-
edly contributes to the low proportion of workers covere d ·. 
by a mandatory retirement policy. The importance of the 
lack of a mandatory retirement poli e y has resulted in the 
fact that many employers have had previou s experience with 
workers remaining on the job past age 65 . While large 
numbers of workers not subject to a retirement policy 
retired at age 65 anyway, 50 employers, or 60 percent of 
the sample, claimed to have had some employees work past age 
65 . 
Generally, employers expected that white collar workers 
would most likely remain in the workforce, with executives, 
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clerical, technical and management staff considered the 
most probable groups to continue working. However, employers 
without a mandatory retirement policy fully expect some 
blue collar workers to want to work longer, a conclusion 
that should not be overlooked as these employers have had 
blue collar workers remain past age 65 and should be better 
able to estimate which workers are likely to continue working. 
In addition, the survey results also suggested that 
blue collar workers have historically retired at an earlier 
age than the age of retirement for white collar workers, 
suggesting that early retirement is most likely a pref erred 
option for blue collar workers. 
When employers were questioned on their views of 
"uncapping" mandatory retirement, the majority of employers 
agreed that mandatory retirement should be abolished and 
predicted that it would have little or no affect. Firms 
which have had mandatory retirement policies in the past 
appeared most apprehensive about uncapping the age of 
retirement. 
Employers were evenly divided on the question of 
whether they expect the trend toward early retirement to 
change, and those that did expect a change believe that 
both men and women will want to work longer. Surprisingly, 
most employers do not agree with proposed changes to increase 
the age of eligibility for Social Security benefits, as 
fully 57 percent of all employers registered moderate to 
strong opposition to this question. 
-87-
Significantly, 50 employers or 60 percent of the 
sample, speculated that under continuing high rates of 
inflation workers would either forego early retirement or 
continue working past the normal retirement age. This is 
considered to portend the reversal of the historical pattern 
toward early retirement, and may play an important role in 
determining the long-term implications of the ADEA. From 
the information gathered during the survey, there has not 
been a dramatic short-term shift in the retirement practices 
of many workers. However, the ~erceived threat of continuing 
high inflation clearly stands out as a major variable in 
the future retirement decisions of workers currently in the 
labor force. Thus, the long-term implications of the ADEA 
may well be determined by how well the country is able to 
control inflation. 
Another important finding relates to the area of 
personnel policies affecting workers. Nearly 25 percent of 
all employers provide older workers with flexible arrange-
ments in order to allow these workers to remain on the job. 
To the extent that future retirement policy changes alter 
the incentives for older workers to remain in the labor 
force, such as through raising or eliminating the earnings 
test, increasing the age of eligibility for Social Security 
benefits or increasing through additional incentives the 
possibility that older workers continue working, we will 
probably see more workers work for longer periods of time. 
This conclusion, although made more from inferences in the 
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survey than from any specific questions contained in the 
survey, warrants closer attention to the issue of further 
changes in retirement policy. 
Perhaps the most important finding in the area of 
personnel policies is that over three-fourths of all employers 
do not have a formal employee performance appraisal system. 
This is considered very important for a number of reasons. 
First, employees may initiate an age discrimination case 
with a private attorney as well as seek remedies through 
the EEOC , and to the extent that the private bar is willing 
to take these cases, we are likely to see more litigation 
over age discrimination. Second, in determining the merits 
of an age discrimination case, courts will closely examine 
the performance appraisal systems utilized by employers, 
and strike down those that are not comprehensive and do not 
apply to all workers . Thus, assuming the scenario of contin-
ued inflation and informal employee appraisal systems, we 
are likely to witness an increase in the number of age dis-
crimination cases against manufacturing firms in Rhode Island. 
Consistent with this finding is the fact that 63 percent 
of all firms surveyed have no formal process to provide 
retraining for their employees, although over 30 percent of 
the firms provide retraining through such practices as 
sending workers to conferences, seminars, conventions, hiring 
consultants to do "in-house " training and by paying for 
educational courses. Less than 10 percent of the firms 
surveyed strive to retrain older workers and a similar 
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number believe this retraining for older workers will block 
lines of advancement for younger workers. This finding was 
particularly true for firms manufacturing durable goods. 
In terms of the impacts on various groups of workers, 
the survey results clearly show that younger workers are 
most likely to be affected by the changes brought about by 
the ADEA of 1978. For younger workers, the impacts will 
likely be a decrease in job opportunities, as well as a 
decrease in relative wages resulting from an inability to 
be promoted into better paying positions. The decreases 
will likely affect many younger workers regardless of the 
skilled or unskilled nature of their job. 
While the information on the perceived impacts for 
younger workers is fairly straightforward, the impacts for 
older workers must be qualified. As a result of the wording 
of the question, it appears that there may have been some 
confusion on its interpretation. The wording of the question 
may have confused some respondents into assuming that the 
question allowed a response to indicate that job opportunities 
were being increased for sooe workers, when the intent was to 
identify which groups lost job opportunities. Thus, the 
information provided in the responses under older workers 
must be considered invalid. This caveat is applicable only 
to the older workers category. 
It appears that the policy impact from the ADEA will be 
greatest for younger workers. They will face increasing 
difficulty in obtaining manufacturing employment and in 
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advancing internally once in the position . To the extent 
that white collar workers remain on the job longer than 
blue collar worker s , competition for white collar jobs 
will be most pronounced . Additional changes in retirement 
age policies , particularly those that provide incentives 
for older workers to remain in the workforce, are likely to 
be successful and will encourage more people, both men and 
women, to work for longer periods of time. Continued high 
inflation is anticipated to be a powerful stimulus for 
workers to remain on the job and when combined with the 
policy changes currently being discussed on the Federal 
level, may decrease dramatically from the overall job 
opportunities and advancement possibilities for younger 
workers. 
In addition , the following suggestions are offerred 
for consideration . First , manufacturing firms should review 
their personnel policies to assure that these policies will 
be in concert with the legislative changes, as well as with 
the potential changes suggested by the survey results. One 
obvious area of concern is the pro c ess used to evaluate the 
performance of wo r kers . Recent court cases involving age 
discr i mination have indicated that employers must utilize a 
reasonable performance appraisal system that is job related, 
written, objective and free of age bias . In as much as the 
majority of employers characterized their personnel appraisal 
systems as informal , it is likely that these systems would 
not withstand legal scrutiny . 
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Also companies should seek, as much as possible, to 
have a broad and equitable age distibution across company 
skill lines. This conclusion is predicated on the fact 
that a number of firms in the survey indicated they specif-
ically sought to retrain older workers in certain specialized 
crafts, suggesting that if a company has too many older 
workers in certain areas it will encoun ter future skills 
replacement problems. 
In yet another vein, the survey results suggest that 
competition for white collar positions will be most pronounced. 
Even without the changes brought about by the ADEA, competition 
for these middle-management and professional positions was 
expected to be intense. The ADEA will further exacerbate 
this situation. Thus, it is likely that many professional 
and managerial workers will experience mid-career crises at 
earlier ages. The result is likely to be greater instability, 
turnover, and, most damaging to the economic vitality of the 
state, outmigration from Rhode Island to other parts of the 
country. This implication is particularly problematic, 
although career counseling and job retraining are possible 
approaches to mitigating this problem within individual firms. 
Since nearly 63 percent of all firms do not have a formal 
process for providing retraining for their employees, 
businesses should reach out to educational institutions to 
provide this retraining. Educational institutions have an 
imperfect grasp of the retraining needs of many firms and 
businesses should be more willing to articulate their 
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retraining needs. However, the most obvious, albeit most 
difficult, solution is to create an environment which makes 
the state an attractive place for companies to expand or 
relocate their businesses . 
Finally, given the large numbers of older workers in 
the state, it is clear that the retirement decisions of 
workers are an important component of the economic health 
of the state . State agencies should examine future devel -
opments through appropriate social indicators in order to 
keep abreast of potential changes in retirement patterns , 
as well as by closely monitoring all legislative t hrusts 
that may affect the retirement decision of workers. 
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APPENDIX A 
SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
Next week a questionaire:from the 
Rhode Island Statewide Planning Program 
will be mailed to your firm. Our survey 
is the first statewide study of the opinions 
of the Rhode Island ousiness community on 
the impacts of raising the retirement age 
from age 65 to age 70. Your company was 
randomly selected from a list of Rhode Island 
businesses and your cooperation in providing 
us with this information is crucial if we 
are to accurately understand the effects of 
the changes in retirement age policy. 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation 
l 
RHODE ISLAND STATEWIDE PLANNING PROGRAM 
265 f1elrose Street 
Providence, Rhode Island 02907 
AGE AND EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES SURVEY 
For classification purposes, please provide the following information: 
Ql: How would you characterize your firm's business activity usino a two-digit code from the 
Standard Industrial Classification code?--------------
Q2: Which category most accurately reflects your averaoe employment? 
1-25 employees 51-100 employees 
26-5Q _employees more than inn emoloyees 
Q3: Approximately how many years has your firm been in business in P. hode Isl and? 
less than 5 years 26-50 years 
----------- 6-10 years ----------- more than 50 years 
----------- 11-25 years 
We would like to begin with some questions regardinp your firm's~ policies on mandatory 
retirement: 
Q4: In 1977, did your firm have a mandatory retirement aae for any of its employees? 
Yes (1) (AtlS~ffR Q5-fJ12) 
No l 2) (SK IP TO fJ 13) 
Q5: At what age were white1collar workers mandatorily retired? Age ___ _ 
Q6: Was this mandatory retirement age part of a: 
pension or profit sharinCJ plan (l) _____ _ 
company policy (2) _____ _ 
collectively bargained union contract(3) _____ _ 
other (Specify) : _________ (
4
) 
Don't Know/No Response \5) _____ _ 
Q7: At what age were blue2 collar workers mandatorily retired? Age 
----
QB: Was this manaatory retirement age part of a: 
pension or profit sharing plan (l) _____ _ 
company policy (2) 
collP-<:tiv<>ly 1-~raafoerl union contract11) _____ _ 
other (Specify) : _________ (
4
) 
Don't Know/No Response (5) _____ _ 
Q9: How have you modified, or how do you intend to modify the mandatorv aoe in order to comply 
with the changes in retirement age policy? Have you or will you: 
increase to age 70 
increase to past age 70 
abolish it entirely 
leave the age unchan9ed 
Don't Know/No Response 
(!) ____ _ 
(2) ____ _ 
(3) ____ _ 
(4) ____ _ 
(5) ____ _ 
QlO : In the next few years do you expect any of your employees to choose to work past the aae 
of 65? 
Yes ( 1) 
No (2) --
Not Sure (3) ~ 
Qll : Do you expect any particular group of your employees to work longer than other oroups? 
Yes ( 1) (ANSWER Q12) 
flo ----(SKIP TO Ql7) 
Not Sure (3) (SKIP TO Q17) 
lwhite collar workers: 
2Blue collar workers: 
prof€ssional and technical, managers and administrators, sales workers 
and clerical workers 
craft workers, operatives, laborers and service workers 
Q21: In 0 rder to structure worktime so that older workers may ease gradually 
into retirement, various plans have been suggested such as flextime, 
part-time options, job redesign, increased vacation time, etc. Has your 
firm considered or adopted plans to help older workers gradually ease 
into retirement? 
Yes (DESCRIBE BELOW) 
NO (SKIP TO Q22) 
Don't Know/No Response 
If yes, describe: 
(l) __ _ 
(2) __ _ 
(3) __ _ 
Q22: In recent years many men and women have elected to retire before age 65, 
particularly at age 62, when reduced Social Securitv benefits first be-
come available. Do you expect any change in this national trend toward 
early retirement? 
Q23: 
Yes (ANSWER Q23) 
No (SKIP Q23) 
Don't Know/No Response 
If yes, do you think that there will be anv differences in 
patterns of men as opposed to the work patterns of women? 
Yes, more men will work longer 
Yes, more women will work longer 
Both sexes will elect to work longer 
(l) __ _ 
(2) __ _ 
(3) 
the wo-r""'"k __ _ 
(l) __ _ 
(2) __ _ 
(3) __ _ 
Q24: Last year (1980) the u. S. Secretary of Commerce proposed increasing the 
age at which full Social Security Lenefits are available to age 68. 
Would you be : 
st~ongly in favor 
moderately in favor 
somewhat in favor 
moderately opposed 
strongly opposeC 
Don 't Know/No Response 
(l) __ _ 
(2) __ _ 
(3) __ _ 
(4) __ _ 
(5) __ _ 
(6) __ _ 
Q25: In your f irm are there ~cific occupations or trades in whDch you strive 
to r:train workers age 6S and older ? 
Yes 
No 
'1nn • +- T'nnw/",in Re~nnp~e 
Q26: llow do you r r ovide for the retraining needs of your employees? 
(l) __ _ 
(2) __ _ 
(3) __ _ 
send to conferences , seminar s, conventions (l} ___ _ 
pay for educational courses (2) 
hire consultants t o nrovicte "in-house" workshops (3) ___ _ 
other (Specify) :--------------------~ 
4) 
don 't provide retraining by any formal process (5) ___ _ 
Q27: Do you anticipate that retraining older workers to age 70 will block 
lines of advancement within any specific occupation or among certain 
types of workers? 
Yes (Specify): ____________________ (l) 
No (2) __ _ 
Don 't Know/No Response (3) __ _ 
Q28: How woul <l you characterize your employee performance appraisal system? 
Pormal 
Informal 
Don't Know/No Response 
(l) __ _ 
(2) __ _ 
(3) __ _ 
Q29: Do you expect your firm to apply its performance appraisal practices 
more rigorously in the future because of the changes in retirement age 
policy? 
Yes (Why?) 
No 
___________________ (l) __ _ 
(2) __ _ 
Don't Know/No Response (3) __ _ 
Q30: What effect do you expect the changes in retirement age to have on your 
organization's policies toward hiring older workers? Will your firm: 
Hire more older workers 
Not change hiring policies 
Hire fewer older workers 
Don't Know/No Response 
(l) __ _ 
(2) __ _ 
(3) __ _ 
(4) __ _ 
ST A TE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANT A TIO NS 
Department of Administration 
STATEWIDE PLANNING PROGRAM 
265 Melrose Street 
Providence, Rhode Island 02907 
February 27, 1981 
Dear Rh ode Island Businessman: 
The enclo sed survey is the first statewide study of the 
opinions of the Rhode Island business co~munity on the impacts 
of raising the retirement age from 65 to 70. Your company was 
randomly selected from a list of Rhode Island businesses and 
your cooperation in providing us with information is crucial 
if we are to accurately understand and pla n for the effects of 
this change in ret irement age policy . 
Please b e assured that all responses will be held in the 
s trictest confidence and results wi ll be displayed only in the 
aggregate. Should you need the results o f the survey for 
planning purposes within your organ ization, or wish to discuss 
the ~uestions contairied in the survey, fe e l free to contact 
either Patrick Fingliss or John O'Brien of our staff at 
277-2656. 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. 
DWV/bam 
Enclosure 
ST A TE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANT A'TIONS 
Department of Administration 
ST A TEWIDE PLANNING PROGRAM 
265 Melrose Street 
Providence, Rhode Island 02907 
DL\I'. E' 1PL'YY[R : 
: iarch 18, 1981 
L a s t u e e ~~ , t h e Rho c e I s l a rd S ta t e w i d l.:! r l o. En l n z Pro g Yan 
,;e l ecte '-' your fir1.1 t .. ro p, h ci ran o:-1 so.mplin g process 
t o participate i n a s t~ tew lde stud y of re ~ irc~2nt aue 
p ol i c i e s . A s n f t o d o. y , \,' e ha 'le n o t y e t r cc e j v c : y c1 u r 
co . p l eted s u es~ io nnair e . 
T 11 i. s st n t ~ w i de st 11 d y \·:a s 11 n C:. er t a l'.-:: n in t he b 2 l j cf that 
t ~, e o ;· i 1 i o ri s o ~ t h <' b u s i :1 e s s c o n 8 u n i t : ' s h o u l c1 h "' kn o ~, n 
a nc.. t.:lkcn i nto acco unt \;hen <lc.t ern inin 0 appro pr iate 
fe.:'..erJ.l c~· Lta:.c pv icy . 1'e ;0 1.s o believe that infor !Tl :>.. tion 
o 11 h o',.; o t. 11 er or '£.a n i z a t .~ •' n ~ a r e : ! ! ! a r> t i n r the i r po 1 i c i es a s 
a r-:: :: ·~· J t ,, :: c ;1,;.,:<.in:_-, soc..:..0 -cc.oeoric. C0"1 c1 i t.i..e>:-- .; '.!ill be 
u s;.~;cul en nc>n:'~Ts of t 11~ b:.is i ness co •:i:cin ity . 
\·"e 2.re \:ri. t i n:, to yo u ~-~ .. (.1 Ln beca::se of the s _ignific [J ll2t=! 
cacl' riuestionnair·2 has to the o ve rall utility of t!1e 
:..tud_- . Simply state<l, in o r der for the res u lts o f t h_;_ _,, 
stu~y to be tr u ly re p res en tativ e of the pri 9 te business 
c o nm u G i t y , i t i 5 e s s e " t i a 1 t l a t e a c h f i rm i n t h e s a l!l p l e 
r · c u r ~ t he q u est i onnaire. 
l n t :1 e e ·.; .:: 11 t t h 2. t y o u r q u e s t i '~ r. n -"· i '- e h a s b e e n ::; J s ? l a ':.: -.: ci 
a r e~l a cem e nt is en c l osed . 
! o u r c o ope~a t ioa is gr e atly a ppreciat ed. 
APPENDIX B 
SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
In order to determine the specific impacts of the 
1978 ADEA Amendments for Rhode Island, a mail survey was 
conducted of 107 manufacturing firms located in the state. 
The survey sampling plan chosen was a random stratified 
sampling methodology using the quota method. Manufacturing 
businesses engaged in the production of goods from Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 20 to 39, excluding 
SIC 21 and 29, were surveyed. These two SIC categories 
were omitted as there are relatively few Rhode Island firms 
engaged in the manufacture of tobacco products (SIC 21) or 
petroleum and coal products (SIC 29). 
Manufacturing firms in Rhode Island were selected for 
the survey sampling plan for a variety of reasons. First, 
the State Commission for Human Rights found that almost half 
of all age discrimination charges were filed on behalf of 
individuals employed in manufacturing industries. Second, 
firms involved in manufacturing employ over 133,000 people 
in Rhode Island, or approximately one-third of the state's 
total labor force and, as such, play a vital role in the 
overall economic health of the state. Third, the 1979 
Portland State University study, the most comprehensive 
analysis of the subject of the 1978 ADEA Amendments, 
unintentionally undersampled manufacturing industries, 
attaining a 20 percent response rate from manufacturing 
firms while the national distribution of manufacturing 
industries is over 30 percent. Fourth, and perhaps most 
important, was the existence of the 1979-80 edition of 
the Directory £i Manufacturers published by the Rhode 
Island Department of Economic Development, which provided 
the name, location and number of employees for over 2,600 
manufacturing firms currently located in Rhode Island. 
This directory provided the framework for the random selection 
of manufacturing firms by two-digit SIC code and allowed 
firms with fewer than four employees, and not covered under 
the R.I . State FEPA age discrimination law or the 1978 ADEA 
Amendments, to be excluded from the sample. The Directory 
was considered a significant universe record and not a 
statistical sample, thus enabling it to be used for the 
purpose of selecting a sample of firms to be surveyed. 
The following table compares the information contained in 
the Directory with data available from ''County Business 
Patterns - 1977" and fourth quarter totals for 1978 for 
firms covered under the R.I. Department of Employment 
Security (DES). 
TABLE B-1 
Comparability of the Directory 
---
with 
Selected Data Sources 
Number of Firms by SIC Code 
1 Patterns 2 DES3 SIC Code Directory County Business 
20 110 132 147 
22 189 192 219 
23 49 60 76 
24 31 49 5 1 
25 40 31 51 
26 68 56 62 
27 186 191 204 
28 87 67 85 
30 106 9 5 113 
31 26 24 28 
32 50 43 58 
33 104 103 10 
34 364 390 408 
35 281 292 280 
36 70 6lf 70 
37 50 44 48 
38 64 45 66 
39 897 929 1300 
1Totals determined by manual tabulations (1979- 80 
Directory£.!. fanufacturers, R.I. Department of Economic 
Development, 1980). 
2Totals provided in "County Business Patterns-1977" 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, pps. 3-6, 1979). 
3Totals provided in "State Summary-Employment and Total 
Payrolls" R.I. Department of Employment Security, 1978. 
As Table B-1 illustrates, the Directory is a closer 
estimate than is the R.I. Department of Employment Security 
information when compared to the information provided in 
"C ounty Business Patterns" in all but six (6) instances. 
While it is recognized that all three data sources were 
prepared in different ways and for different years, the 
Directory does not reflect any totals that are unrepresent-
ative and do not jeopardize the use of the Directory as a 
basis for conducting the survey. 
As an additional check on the reliability of the 
Directory as an appropriate sampling resource, the employment 
totals provided in the Directo_EY were compared to the employ-
ment totals provided in "County Business Patterns" and the 
fourth quarter Department of Employnent Security information 
for 1978. This comparison, presented in the following table, 
again suggest the Directory is a reliable survey tool as 
manufacturing employment rose from the 1977 figure provided 
by the "County Business Pattern" summary of 125,725 manufact-
uring workers to a 1978 total of 135,745, as reported by the 
Department of Employment Security, a cc ounting in part for 
the discrepancy among some of the totals. In addition, 
larger totals in the Directory column are a result of the 
fact that firms producing products that fall into two or 
more SIC groups are listed each time, with the result that 
the employment totals are inflated. Similarly, employment 
totals provided in the Directory appear, in many instances, 
to be rounded numbers, also inflating the total employment 
figure for each SIC category. 
TABLE B-2 
Comparability E.f the Directory 
with 
Selected Data Sources 
Total Employment by SIC Code 
SIC Code Directoryl County Business Patterns2 DES 3 
20 3,846 3,715 3,861 
22 14,392 13,681 12,501 
23 4,431 2,753 3,764 
24 468 250-499 606 
25 1, 13 9 838 1 , 1 9 1 
26 3, 713 2,717 3,127 
27 5,058 4,769 5,184 
28 6,072 2,934 2,992 
30 10,121 5,274 7, 195 
31 3,042 2,783 3,623 
32 3,529 1,711 3,370 
33 10,155 9 , lD 1 6,479 
34 12' 14 1 15,432 10,699 
35 11,715 9,305 9,699 
36 10,854 9,521 11,783 
37 6,668 1,835 6,130 
38 8,468 4,999 5,342 
39 37,839 32,189 38,186 
1Totals determined by manual tabulations (1979-80 
Directory £.f Manufacters, R.I. Department of Economic Devel-
opment, 1980). 
2Totals provided in "County Business Patterns-1977, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, pps . 3-6, 1979. 
3Totals provided in "State Summary-Employment and Total 
Payrolls" R.I. Department of Emp loyment Security, 1978. 
Thus, the Directory £.f Manufacters was determined to 
provide an acceptable list of the manufacturing industries 
located in Rhode Island because the information contained in 
the Directory was consistent with other information from 
"County Business Patterns" and the R.I. Department of Employment 
Security . In addition , the Directory was also considered 
an acceptable universe record because it included firms 
from all parts of the state and as such can be considered 
geographically representative of the distribution of man-
ufacturing firms in the state . Finally, the Directory 
was used because it did not , by design, systematically 
exclude any firms from being listed . 
Once th e .decision was made to use the Directory as the 
basis for the selection of firms , a sampling plan wa s prepared . 
A lottery-type selection of firms was considered, but rejected 
on the basis that it would not guarantee that all SIC groups 
would be included in the survey . In order to achieve coverage 
in every SIC category from 20 to 39, excluding SIC 21 and 29, 
a stratified sample was considered to be most appropriate. 
In addition, this stratified sample was constructed to utilize 
the quo ta method , rather than the proportional method . 
Although the proportional method was considered, it 
was not u sed because of Rhode Island ' s relatively undiverse 
economic base . A proportional sample would have involved 
sampling indus tries by SIC in proportion to the distribution 
of these firms withih the total R.I . manufa c turing base . 
Fo r e x ampl e , if a p r o portio n al stratified survey had been 
used, SIC 20 (Food and Kindred Porducts) employing about 3 
percent of the manufacturing labor force would have resulted 
in 3 percent of the survey total being selected from this 
SIC group. This method raised the possibility that if the 
small number of firms to be surveyed in SIC 20 chose not to 
respond, there would not be any coverage in that SIC group . 
While the possibility that firms will elect not to respond 
to a survey is clearly inherent in every survey design, there 
are survey sampling plans which can, to a large extent, 
increase the possibility of coveraee in every subset. 
In order to achieve the goal of coverage in every SIC 
category, the sampling plan was designed to include a 
stratification system using the quota method. The sampling 
plan was stratified by SIC code, dividing each SIC stratum 
into three subsets: first, those firms employing between 4 
and 19 workers; second, firms employing between 20 and 99 
workers; and third, firms employing more than 100 workers . 
The quota method involved randomly selecting two firms from 
each of these subsets, thereby allowing for a maximum of 
six (6) firms from each SIC code. Thus; the sampling plan 
allowed for a maximum of 108 surveys, a result of six (6) 
surveys for each of the eighteen (18) SIC codes. Once the 
random sampling began it became apparent that SIC 24 (Lumber 
and Wood Products) would not legitimately provide the 
required number of responses. As a result, this SIC was 
sampled to include only five (5) firms, instead of the goal 
of six (6) firms, reducing the total number of surveys to 
107. 
The following table shows the distribution contained 
in the Directory of firms by size and highlights the sampling 
constraint in SIC 24. 
TABLE B-3 
SIC Code £y Employment Size 
No 
SIC Co de 1-19 20-99 100 or more Response 
20 66 30 8 6 
22 49 82 48 10 
23 25 12 12 0 
24 22 6 1 2 
25 28 8 2 2 
26 17 35 13 3 
27 118 41 14 13 
28 49 20 12 6 
30 39 42 22 3 
31 8 12 5 1 
32 23 16 7 4 
33 48 29 22 5 
34 200 115 25 24 
35 186 70 18 7 
36 16 28 2lf 11 
37 25 13 8 4 
38 2 7 20 13 4 
39 424 308 86 79 
Source: Manual tabulations of the Directory of ~fanufacturers, 
R . I . Department of Economic Development, 1979-80 . 
The information in the preceeding table is particularly 
useful in identifying a number of specific concerns regarding 
the survey methodology . In all but five SIC categories, 
small firms employing less than twe nty workers constitu t e 
over half of the total number of manufacturing firms doing 
business in the state . This large number of s mall firms is 
somewhat higher than the national distribution of small firms, 
although nationally small firms comprise over one quarter of 
all businesses . However, the sampling plan was construct e d 
to rando ml y sel e c t t wo f irms fro m eac h of the abo ve s u bsets, 
t he r eby r ed ucing the number o f small firms, as a p ro portion 
of the total, and increasing the number of medium and large 
firms, again as a proportion of the total. The sampling 
plan can then be criticized on the basis that it under-
sampled small firms by utilizing the quota method rather 
than the proportional method. However, it should be pointed 
out that the Portland State study found the greatest impacts 
of the 1978 ADEA Amendments among large firms and the sampling 
plan was constructed under the assumption that the size of 
the firm was an important variable in assessing the impacts 
of the legislation. 
A second concern of the sampling plan regards the 
arbitrary selection of the total number of firms included 
in the sample. As a result, the sampling plan can be 
criticized on the basis that it undersampled certain SIC 
categories by utilizing the quota method. For example, 
SIC 20, which employs about 3 percent of the total manu-
facturing workforce was sampled to the same extent as was 
SIC 39, Miscellaneous fanufacturin g , which employs about 
32 percent of the total manufacturing workforce. This 
undersamplin g was considered unaviodable considering time 
and resource constraints. 
The following table displays the geographic distribution 
of the firms contacted during the survey . As the table 
illustrates, firms located in twenty-eight (28) communities, 
employing over 14,800 workers, were surveyed. The totals 
closely parallel the general distribution of manufacturing 
firms in Rho de Island, with Providence accounting for the 
the greatest number of firms surveyed, followed by 
Pawtucket, Yarwick and East Provi<lence. 
TABLE B-4 
Geographical Distribution of Surveyed Firms 
City .£.E_ Town Number of Firms 
Barrington 1 
Burrillville 1 
Central Falls 5 
Coventry 1 
Cranston 7 
Cumberland 2 
East Greenwich 4 
East Providence 8 
Exeter 1 
Hopkinton 1 
Johnston 2 
Lincoln 2 
Middletown 1 
Newport 1 
North Kingstown 1 
North Providence 1 
North Smithfield 2 
Pawtucket 14 
Portsmouth 1 
Providence 24 
Scituate 2 
Smithfield 4 
South Kingstown 2 
Warren 4 
West Warwick 3 
Westerly 1 
Woonsocket 3 
Total 107 
Approximately 4 percent of the firms engaged in manu-
facturing enterprises were surveyed, although nearly 10 
pe rcent of the total workers employed in manufacturing were 
surveyed . This proportional difference is the result of 
the sampling plan design to include firms employing more 
than 100 workers as one-third of the entire sample. As a 
result, some of the largest private manufacturing employers 
in Rhode Island, including eight employers of over 400 
people and two employers of over 1,000 workers, were 
included in the sample. 
Research into the use of mail s u rvey techniques indicated 
that there were a number of approaches that increase, albeit 
slightly, the overall response rate . For example, the use 
of an introductory postcard announcing that a survey woul d 
be forthcoming, the use of first-class mail, a cover letter, 
a followup letter accompanied by another copy of the survey 
and a survey printed on different colored paper have all 
been found to increase the response rate in mail surveys. 
Generally , the response rate in mail surveys is between 40 
and 50 percent, with a response rate of 75 percent achieved 
only rarely and under optimal conditions. 
Two other significant variables to the success of the 
mail survey approach included the "intrinsic value " factor and 
the !'closed response" approach . The "intrinsic value " factor 
indicated that the greater the intrinsic interest of the 
subject of the survey to the questions included in the survey, 
the higher the response rate. The "closed response" approach 
indicated that higher response rates would result if those 
surveyed could expFess their views by selecting among pre-
determined responses rather than by asking respondents to 
provide lengthy and time consuming respon s es. The closed 
response also facilitates coding and comparability of 
responses. 
All these techniques were utilized in guiding the 
development and implementation of the survey. The survey 
was designed utilizing the closed response approach, allowing 
for limited explanatory responses. Surveys were preceeded 
by a postcard and the survey included a cover letter under 
the signature of the Chief of the Rhode Island Statewide 
Planning Program, under whose auspices the survey was 
conducted. The survey was printed on blue paper and was 
mailed with a self-addressed, stamped envelope bearing the 
Statewide Planning Program address. A followup letter, 
including another copy of the survey and another self-addressed, 
stamped envelope was sent to respondents who failed to return 
the initial questionnaire. 
In addition, all surveys were addressed to the personnel 
director on the assumption that this person had, by virtue 
of position, the best vantage point to answer the questions 
contained in the survey. The personnel director, whether 
the owner of the company, as in the case of a small business 
or an individual, as in the case of a larger company, would 
have the greatest interest in the personnel affairs of that 
company and presumably would view the questions contained 
in the survey within the "intrinsic value" context. 
"' 
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